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COMPENSATION FOR PAIN: A REAPPRAISAL 
IN LIGHT OF NEW. MEDICAL EVIDENCE 
Cornelius]. Peck* 
DAMAGES for pain and suffering have long provided a target for critics of the present tort law system.1 Courts and commentators 
have characterized payments for pain and suffering as uncertain,2 
"anomalous" in light of present day theories of loss allocation,3 and 
without "consistent significance."4 Longstanding medical theory, 
however, supports the hypothesis that the conduct of the tortfeasor is 
the primary cause of the pain experienced by the victim.5 Thus, de-
fenders of compensation for pain and suffering can relate their claim 
to a general objective of tort jurisprudence: A wrongdoer who causes 
harm should provide such compensation to an innocent victim as 
will place the latter in the position he would have occupied but for 
the ·wrongdoing. 
The theory that a primary causal link exists benveen the victim's 
pain and the tortfeasor's acts provides considerable appeal for the 
proposition that the wrongdoer should compensate for the victim's 
pain. However, recent investigations of the phenomenon of pain by 
disciplines of the health sciences have challenged the medical theory 
upon which recoveries for pain and suffering are based. The results 
of that work are of obvious interest to the legal profession, for the 
new view of pain suggests that the tortfeasor's acts bear only a 
tangential relationship to the pain that some victims experience. The 
results thus raise questions of how well the recognition given pain 
and suffering under existing law serves the interests of society in 
general and of tort law in particular. An improved understanding of 
the phenomenon of pain can be put to immediate and practical use 
by lawyers and judges working with cases ~at involve damage claims 
for pain and suffering. 
• Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.S. 1944, LL.B. 1949, Harvard Uni-
versity.-Ed. 
I. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 I.Aw 8: 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 219 (1953); Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 476 (1959); Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 200 (1958); 
Proehl, Anguish of Mind: Damages for Mental Suffering under Illinois Law, 56 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 477 (1961). 
2. Plant, supra note 1, at 211. 
3. Seifert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 511, 364 P.2d 337, 345, 
15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting). 
4. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 224. 
5. See text accompanying notes 6-7 infra. 
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I. THE CURRENT MEDICAL VIEWS OF p AIN 
Until quite recently medical researchers accepted the view that 
pain was caused by stimulation of specialized pain receptors. Ad-
vocates of this "specificity theory" suggested that stimulation activat-
ing the nerve endings resulted from action that either destroyed or 
irritated tissue. The impulse produced by the stimulation in the 
peripheral nerve was thought to be transmitted to the spinal column 
and relayed to the higher levels of the nervous system, passing 
through the brain from the thalamus to the somatosensory cortex. 
Stimulation of the receptor, it was thought, always elicited pain and 
elicited only the sensation of pain.6 In layman's terms, the process 
approximated the receipt of a message sent over a telephone system 
designed to transmit messages clearly and distinctly. The system was 
not designed to produce messages, and only its malfunction could 
cause alterations or modifications of the messages.7 
For tort law, the specificity theory implied that, since a painful 
experience required physical stimulation of the peripheral nerves, 
the tortious contact caused by the ·wrongdoer produced the victim's 
discomfort. So long as physical injury was considered a sine qua non 
of pain and suffering the party who caused the injury was believed 
responsible. 
Recent studies, however, have established that a theory of pain 
based only on tissue damage or irritation cannot explain all the ob-
servations of pain in persons who are neither psychiatrically dis-
turbed nor suffering from mental disorders.8 These studies indicate 
that pain is not one sensation varying only in intensity; it is many 
varied sensations.9 As one observer put it, we should perhaps discuss 
6. See H. MERSKEY & F. SPEAR, PAIN: PsYCHOLOGICAL AND PsYCHlATRIC As1'£CTS 2'7 
(1967); R. STERNBACH, PAIN: A PsYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 39-40 (1968); Casey, The 
Neurophysiologic Basis of Pain, 53 PoSTGRAD. MED., May 1973, at 58; Melzack &: Wall, 
Psychophysiology of Pain, 8 INTL. AN£STH. CLINICS 3, 4-6 (1970). Consistent with the 
specific receptor theory is the fact that some nerve fibers have a particularly large 
diameter and are sheathed with a fatty substance known as myelin; other nerves 
have a smaller diameter and lack an insulating cover. The larger myelinated nerve 
fibers conduct impulses at a much faster rate than the smaller nerves. Tl1is may 
account for the two types of pain many persons report following an injury, the first 
being a bright, pricking pain and the second a dull, aching pain. See R. Sn:RNnAcH, 
supra, at 30. But see id. at 30-31. 
7. Proponents of the specificity theory recognized certain aberrations in their 
hypothesis. The phantom pains of an amputee obviously are not caused by nerve 
endings in the foot that has been removed. In very rare cases persons with mental 
disorders suffer hysterical pain, and other psychiatric disturbances may produce 
complaints of pain with no organic basis. These were viewed as exceptional cases, 
in which the nervous system was operating improperly. 
8. See H. MERSKEY & F. SPEAR, supra note 6, at 28-30; R. STERNDACH, supra note 6, 
at 9-12; Casey, supra note 6, at 59. 
9. See R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 2; T. SZASZ, PAIN AND PLEASURE Jo.JI, 40 
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pain as Eskimos discuss snow, assigning a separate word to each of the 
forms in which snow may be found but dispensing with a single 
word encompassing all of its forms.10 
One of the first departures from the specificity theory postulated 
that pain resulted from a pattern of nerve stimuli reported to the 
central nervous system. According to this "pattern theory," the 
quality of pain is determined by the spatiotemporal configuration of 
impulses over nerve routes that serve general sensory functions and 
are not specific for pain.11 The pattern theory departs from the tele-
phone message model; it assumes the existence of some central ner-
vous system process that evaluates the pattern of nerve impulses 
received from a peripheral source. 
A much more radical departure from the specificity theory was 
the formulation by Doctors Ronald Melzack and P. D. Wall of a 
theory of "gate control" of nerve impulses arriving at the spinal 
column.12 Essentially, Melzack and Wall propose that the densely 
packed nerve cells in the dorsal horn of the spinal cord-known as 
the substantia gelatinosa-mediate, moderate, and filter the incoming 
signals from peripheral nerves. These signals consist of impulses 
traveling along small diameter unmyelinated (uninsulated) or thinly 
myelinated nerves-an essential component of physiological pain-
and faster-traveling impulses conducted along larger diameter 
myelinated nerve fibers. The impulses traveling along the larger 
diameter fibers normally produce the sensations of touch and pres-
sure, and quickly activate the first central transmission cells (T cells), 
which transmit signals to higher levels of the central nervous system. 
The pain impulses, traveling along the smaller nerve fibers, at first 
have little effect upon the T cells, but their effect is enhanced as that 
of the impulses of the larger myelinated nerve fibers diminishes. 
How~ver, further stimulation of the larger sensory nerves will 
dampen and reduce the effect of the pain impulses received from the 
smaller nerve fibers. (It thus may be that a mother in fact reduces the 
pain sensation when she kisses and rubs a bumped head or knee.) 
The exact process that controls the operation of the "gate," or 
the filtering function, remains uncertain, but the filtering appears to 
(1957); Sternbach, Strategies and Tactics in the Treatment of Patients with Pain, in 
PAIN AND SUFFERING 176-77 (B. Crue ed. 1970). 
10. T. SZASZ, supra note 9, at 10. 
11. See R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 40-41; Melzack and Wall, supra note 6, 
at 7-10. 
12. Melzack &: Wall, Gate Control Theory of Pain, in PAIN 11 (A. Soulairac, J. Cahn 
&: J. Charpentier eds. 1968); Melzack &: Wall, supra note 6. See generally Casey, supra 
note 6, 
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be regulated by some central mechanism from the brain that has been 
triggered into action by the patterned impulses transmitted through 
the T cells. Thus it appears that a physiological mechanism exists 
through which the higher levels of the central nervous system control 
the sensory input of pain.13 Melzack and Wall summarize the sig-
nificance of this system for the psychological control of pain: 
[l]t is important to recognize the role of cognitive or "higher central 
nervous system" activities such as anxiety, attention, and suggestion 
in pain processes. The model suggests that psychological factors such 
as past experience, attention, and emotion influence pain response 
and perception by acting on the gate control system. The degree of 
central control, however, would be determined, in part at least, by 
the temporal-spatial properties of the input patterns. Some of the 
most unbearable pains, such as cardiac pain, rise so rapidly in inten-
sity that the patient is unable to achieve any control over them. On 
the other hand, more, slowly rising temporal patterns are susceptible 
to central control and may allow the patient to "think about some-
thing else" or use other stratagems to keep the pain under control.14 
Other researchers have challenged some aspects of Melzack and 
Wall's assertions,15 and the theory will undoubtedly undergo further 
development. Gate control assumes additional significance, however, 
insofar as it complements and helps to explain physiologically the 
contributions made by psychiatrists and psychologists with respect to 
the understanding of pain. For example, Melzack and Wall refer to 
the pain experiences of men wounded in battle,16 an allusion to Dr. 
Henry Beecher's study of soldiers injured in the battle on Anzio 
13. Melzack &: Wall, supra note 6, at 22. The researchers describe the physiology 
of the phenomenon: 
It is now firmly established that stimulation of the brain activates descending 
efferent fibers ..• which can influence afferent conduction at the earliest synaptic 
levels of the somesthetic system •••• There is evidence • • • to suggest that these 
central influences are mediated through the gate control system. While some 
central activities, such as anxiety or excitement, may open or close the {fate 
for all inputs at any site of the body, others obviously involve selective, localized 
gate activity. For example, men wounded in battle may feel little or no pain 
from the wound (because it signifies that they survived the battle) but may com-
plain bitterly about an inept vein puncture. • • • The signals, then, must be 
identified, evaluated in terms of prior experience, localized, and inhibited before 
the action system responsible for pain reception and response is activated. We 
propose, therefore, that there exists in the nervous system a mechanism, which 
we call the central control trigger, that activates the particular, selective brain 
process that exerts control over the sensory input processes. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
14. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). See also Melzack &: Chapman, Psychologic Aspects 
of Pain, 53 PosrcRAD. MED., May 1973, at 69, 69-70. 
15. See Christensen & Perl, Spinal Neurons Specifically Exdted by Noxious or 
Thermal Stimuli: Marginal Zone of the Dorsal Horn, 33 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 293 
(1970); Mosso &: Kruger, Spinal Trigeminal Neurons Excited by Noxious and Thermal 
Stimuli, 38 BRAIN RESEARCH 206 (1972). 
16. See note 13 supra. 
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beachhead during World War II.17 The men studied had been under 
shell fire for several weeks when they received wounds that were 
serious enough to require their hospitalization and eventual evacua-
tion. When questioned seven to twelve hours after being wounded, 
only a little more than one quarter of the men said that they had 
enough pain to require treatment, such as administration of a pain 
killer.18 In a comparison group of civilians who had undergone 
planned surgery in a hospital, 87 per cent said within an average of 
2.9 hours after their operation that they wanted treatment for their 
pain.19 Dr. Beecher believed that the battle wounds, consisting of 
flesh torn and bones broken by flying shrapnel, provided a greater 
physiological basis for pain than did the carefully executed incisions 
of surgeons.20 He therefore attributed the difference in the pain re-
sponses of the two gi:oups to something other than the degree of 
physical destruction caused by the wound. For the men at Anzio, 
wounds provided an escape from a situation involving great anxiety 
and fear of death.21 The neat, surgical incisions of the civilians, on 
the other hand, signified tragedy. The soldiers' wounds resulted in a 
lessening of anxiety about their futures; anxieties of the surgical 
patients may have been intensified. Dr. Beecher's data thus support 
the widely held hypothesis that anxiety increases the intensity of 
pain.22 
Anxiety is a conditioned (anticipatory) fear response, and the 
extent to which one suffers pain can therefore be expected to vary 
with the ease with which he is conditioned to expect unpleasantness. 
Individuals with a personality type characterized as extrovert are 
not as easily conditioned and bring less of this pain component to a 
situation than introverts, who are more easily conditioned.23 
Natural childbirth as now practiced in the United States furnishes 
an excellent example of how anxiety affects the amount of pain 
experienced. The exercises performed and the classes attended by an 
17. Beecher, Relationship of Significance of Wound to Pain Experienced, 161 
J.A.M.A. 1609 (1956). 
18. Id. at 1610. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 1612. 
22. See J. BoNICA, THE MANAGEMENT OF PAIN 156 (1953); R. STERNBACH, supra 
note 1, at 69-70; Clark 8: Mehl, Thermal Pain: A Sensory Decision Theory Analysis, 
78 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 202, 208 (1971); Melzack 8: Chapman, supra note 14, 
at 70-71; Smith, Some Medicolegal Aspects of Pain, Suffering and Mental Anguish in 
American Law and Culture, in PAIN AND SUFFERING, supra note 9, at 186, 195-96. 
23. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 67-72. See also H. MERSKEY 8: F. SPEAR, supra 
note 6, at 161-62. 
1360 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:1!155 
expectant mother in preparation for a natural childbirth un-
doubtedly increase that woman's physical capabilities, but they also 
develop an attitude of confidence, understanding, and freedom from 
fear. Such an attitude permits some women to endure childbirth 
sensations that others find so intolerable as to require anesthesia.24 
The behavior of recipients in organ transplant operations fur-
nishes another striking illustration. To ensure the acceptance of the 
transplanted organ the recipient is frequently not given analgesic 
medication. He is, however, psychologically prepared for the trans-
plant and strongly desires it; consequently he often reports no pain. 
Donors likewise are frequently free of pain.26 
II. THE "SOCIAL" CONTENT OF PAIN 
It is thus apparent that pain can no longer be considered simply 
a physiological phenomenon. It has a social and interpersonal aspect 
from birth. The pain that produces the baby's cry in tum elicits com-
forting and loving support from parents or protectors. Similarly, in 
early childhood pain is commonly associated with discipline and 
hence with parental or social disapproval. At this time the superego 
of the personality structure is developing, so that from the beginning 
pain is firmly connected with guilt. A child learns not only that his 
behavior can be influenced by pain inflicted upon him, but that he 
may influence the behavior of others by inflicting pain on them. Pain 
thus achieves recognition as an effective control of conduct, useful 
even for the control of one's own aggressions.26 
Pain continues to have an interpersonal communicative role 
when an individual emerges from childhood. Manifestations of pain 
remain effective to communicate appeals for attention, love, and sup-
24. J. BoNICA, supra note 22, at 151; G. DICK-READ, CmLDBIRTII WITIIOUT FEAR 
46-48 (1959); R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 25. Cultural differences in the attitudes 
of women toward childbirth undoubtedly affect their anxieties. In some societies 
women are able to give birth naturally without crying out or writhing. See J. EMDREE, 
SUYE MURA, A JAPANESE VILLAGE 178-79 (1939); M. MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA 20 
(1961). See also G. DICK-READ, supra, at 2. 
25. Letter from Dr. Richard G. Black, Coordinator of the Pain Clinic of the 
University of Washington, to the author, January 7, 1974, on file with the Michigan 
Law Review. Dr. Black's impression is that the donors he did treat for pain were 
those whose donated organ was biologically rejected by the recipient. Id. 
26. See R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 87; Engel, "Psychogenic" Pain and the 
Pain-Prone Patient, 26 AM. J. MED. 899, 901 (1959). Indeed, the phenomenon of pain 
is so affected by the interpersonal relationships of childhood that it has been 
reported that individuals raised in large families manifest more pain behavior than 
those raised in small families. Gonda, The Relation Between Complaints of Persistent 
Pain and Family Size, 25 J. NEUROL, NEUROSURG, PSYCHIATRY 277, 277-81 (1962). See 
also H. MERSKEY Se F. SPEAR, supra note 6, at 176. Problems of communication arise 
in large families, and the manifestation of pain may be a more effective communica-
tion than a well-stated request. 
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port among adults, and they are so used.27 It is not only a Pavlov's 
dog or a grain-seeking pigeon that can be conditioned to perform in a 
certain manner because that performance usually earns a reward or 
avoids an undesirable consequence; the connection between the de-
sired goal and a pattern of behavior may also be perceived and acted 
upon by humans at levels below rational articulation.28 
Social factors may even produce pain that lacks an adequate 
organic or physiological basis. In the literature of pain, this phenom-
enon has been designated "psychogenic" pain.29 Psychogenic pain 
may validate communications requesting help or establishing an 
excuse. For example, the aging laborer learns that manifestation of 
pain will obtain for him a period of rest. Perhaps he has gradually 
found the work not only physically exhausting but socially embar-
rassing, because it demonstrates his declining physical condition and 
the superiority of the young men with whom he works. Pain may 
provide an excuse for staying away from work and avoiding not only 
physical burden but social embarrassment. Or a younger workman, 
threatened by the removal of a supportive supervisor or the arrival 
of a workman whose performance is at a higher level, may feel enough 
pain to justify absenting himself from the potential challenges and 
embarrassment of work. Similarly, the housewife who experiences 
and manifests pain may thus avoid the housework she despises. A per-
son who does not desire sexual relations may, upon experiencing 
pain, learn that it provides an excuse for not satisfying the partner's 
demands.30 
27. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 87-90. Cf. Szasz, The Psychology of Persistent 
Pain, in PAIN, supra note 12, at 93, 93-95. 
28. There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, about students of B.F. Skinner who 
decided to bring to an end the peripatetic lecture style of one of their professors. 
They agreed upon a "reward corner" in the lecture room, and manifested great 
interest in the portions of a lecture delivered from that place-an interest that 
diminished in proportion to the distance by which the professor removed himself from 
that corner. As the story goes, the students had the professor pinned in the corner 
within two weeks, though he did not know why he had altered his lecture style. 
29. See Engel, supra note 26. 
30. Of course, it is not only tensions of work or family life that may provide the 
incentive for utilizing pain to achieve desired adjustments. Indeed, it may be the 
absence of interest or activity that provides the situation in which pain is rewarding. 
Thus, a woman whose children have grown and left the house or whose husband 
has become inattentive may learn that manifestation of pain produces interest and 
concern. If her pain is great enough she will break the monotony of home life by 
consulting a doctor. If her pain does not respond to treatment she may become a 
subject of special interest and attract the attention of several medical experts. If she 
experienced her first pain in an accident her pain may in addition bring the attention 
and concern of her lawyer. Similarly, the individual whose career has reached its 
culmination may find that it is no longer interesting, and may seek another career 
in a life of pain. The noted psychiatrist Thomas Szasz has described such persons as 
having adopted a career of suffering. Szasz, supra note 27, at 97-99. Others agree that 
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In psychological terms, these individuals have been subjected to 
operant conditioning. "Operant" pain is learned pain, produced by 
systematic and repeated environmental consequences following pain 
manifestation.31 Psychologists might assert that those who experience 
operant pain have learned to do so as a defense to or escape from an 
aversive situation. Additionally, expressions of concern and solicitude 
from others may reinforce the manifestations of pain. The pain that 
has thus been learned may be repeated and rewarded even though its 
pathologic or organic stimulus lessens or disappears. It becomes 
chronic, and the patient does not respond to normal treatment.32 
The experience of psychogenic pain does not, however, imply 
serious mental disorder. On the contrary, as explained by Professor 
Wilbert E. Fordyce: 
It is quite unnecessary to postulate some form of personality problem 
or emotional disturbance. It is equally true that, once burdened with 
some seemingly noxious or uncomfortable behavioral habit such as 
pain (smoking, persistent overeating, excessive drinking are equally 
illustrative), only very rarely does one change that behavior by de-
ciding to do so. Habits are acquired by one's having undergone 
repeated learning experiences. Habits are changed by undergoing 
systematic re-learning or de-conditioning.33 
The experience of psychogenic pain, therefore, may indicate nothing 
more than the fulfillment of some need that has previously been satis-
fied by "real" (physiologically based) pain. A person ridden with 
guilt may find in pain a rewarding punishment for the guilty conduct 
that obsesses him.34 Guilt-ridden patients may even reject painless 
there are many such persons. Hirschfeld &: Behan, The Accident Process (pt. I), 186 
J.A.M.A 193 (1963); Melzack &: Chapman, supra note 14, at 72; Sternbach, Murphy, 
Akeson &: Wolf, Chronic Low-Back Pain-The "Low-Back Loser," 53 PosrGRAD, MED,, 
May 1973, at 135; 137. 
31. See Fordyce, An Operant Conditioning Method for Managing Chronic Pain, 
53 PosrcRAD. MED., May 1973, at 123, 123-28. "Psychogenic pain" is the terminology 
of psychiatrists; the term "operant pain" is used by psychologists. Dr. George Engel 
explains in his leading article that the term "psychogenic pain" has in recent years 
been applied by exclusion to those instances in which no physiological cause of pain 
can be demonstrated, making it an appropriate term for all types of pain that serve 
as psychic regulators. Engel, supra note 26, at 916. 
32. Brodsky, Social Psychiatric Consequences of Job Incompetence, 12 COllll'RE• 
HENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 526 (1971); Fordyce, supra note 31, at 123-25. A case history 
illustrative of some aspects of this process may be found in A. 'WATSON, PSYCHIATRY 
FOR LAWYERS 284-87 (1968). 
33. Letter from Wilbert E. Fordyce, Professor of Rehabilitation Medicine, School 
of Medicine, University of Washington, to the author, December 28, 1973, on file 
with the Michigan Law Review. 
34. H. MERSKEY &: F. SPEAR, supra note 6, at 86, 172; R. STERNBACH, sttpra note 6, 
at 72, 145-46; Engel, supra note 26, at 905; Ripley, The Psychologic Basis of Pain, in 
J. BoNICA, supra note 22, at 143, 148. 
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treatment and instead accept painful procedures.35 An individual may 
also use pain to control aggressiveness or sexual desires that he be-
lieves to be ,vrongful or forbidden.36 Some persons apparently sub-
stitute p~in for a loved one who has died.37 Amputees who have 
chronically painful phantom limbs probably "need" the pain for 
psychological reasons: It may be an expression of anger turned 
toward themselves, a denial of the loss of the limb, or a means of 
justifying unacceptable dependency needs.38 Finally, pain is useful to 
persons who are lonely. Most conversations require that the partici-
pants know something about the subject and be interested in it, 
whether it be sports, current events, literature, or something else. 
Pain, however, is a subject that everyone understands and about 
which a speaker is an expert if the pain described is his own. It is, 
moreover, a subject that may be raised formally as an appropriate 
response to casual greetings, even from relative strangers. 
So well does pain serve the needs of some of its sufferers that they 
resist efforts to bring about a cure. Thus, it has been suggested that 
some injured workmen fight to preserve their incapacity, hiding 
symptoms from their doctor for fear that he will diagnose and treat 
them. Such patients may avoid doctors who seem likely to cure them 
and seek out doctors who pose no such threat.39 The anesthesiologist 
who succeeds in using an analgesic to block pain may encounter 
violent hostility from the patient whose pain he has taken away.40 
Furthermore, patients with chronic pain are among the most re-
luctant to accept a psychiatric referral or to participate in psycho-
therapy.41 
35. Engel, supra note 26, at 905. 
36. Id. at 909. 
37. Id. at 901, 908. 
38. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 131-32. 
39. Hirschfeld &: Behan, supra note 30, at 196-98. 
40. Such a case was described by Dr. Richard G. Black, Coordinator of the Pain 
Clinic of the University of Washington Medical School to Dr. Herbert Ripley, a 
psychiatrist associated with the Clinic, at one of the sessions of the Clinic attended 
by the author. A suggestion made by Dr. Ripley was that the patient was a man 
"who needs his pain." 
41. Engel, supra note 26, at 917; Fellner, Post-Traumatic Neurosis-Theme and 
Variations, 37 INDUS. MED. &: SURGERY 347, 348 (1968). 
Persons suffering from chronic pain are frequently depressed, a condition caused 
for some by the self-analysis induced by a serious injury or illness. Miller &: Fellner, 
Compensable Injuries and Accompanying Neurosis: The Problem of Continuing In-
capacity Despite Medical Recovery, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 184, 189. But it is erroneous to 
assume that all depressed persons suffering from chronic pain are depressed because 
of their pain; instead, their pain may be a manifestation of their depression. Engel, 
supra, at 915; Hirschfeld &: Behan, supra note 30, at 195-96; Melzack and Chapman, 
supra note 14, at 71; Sternbach, Murphy, Akeson &: Wolf, supra note 30, at 136. 
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The principle of cognitive dissonance42 helps explain why some 
individuals adopt a life of pain. According to this principle, persons 
tend to maintain consistent views, or cognitions, about themselves 
and the world. The presence of dissonance-inconsistency-gives 
rise to pressures to restore cognitive equilibrium. A person experi-
ences dissonance if his view of himself conflicts with the image he 
wishes to present to others. The desire to present the image of one in 
pain, which may arise for many reasons, including those discussed 
above, may thus prompt a person subconsciously to nurture weak im-
pulses from peripheral nerves into disabling or intolerable pain.43 
It should be added that recent studies establish that pain thresh-
olds and pain tolerance vary among cultures, races, age groups, and 
sexes. Social forces are a very likely cause of the variations. Generally 
speaking, men exhibit a greater tolerance for pain than women.44 
Younger persons have a greater tolerance for pain than older per-
sons.45 Tolerance of pain also has an identifiable relationship with 
race and nationality. For example, Jews and Italians are not as in-
hibited about displays of suffering as the "older American" types,46 
and, contrary to the stereotype of the inscrutable Oriental, one study 
indicates that Orientals have less tolerance for pain than whites, with 
blacks occupying a middle ground.47 Schizophrenics, perhaps because 
of a divorce of ego from body, have a much greater tolerance for pain 
than normal individuals.48 Even among individuals with no markedly 
distinguishing characteristics reaction to pain stimuli may vary 
greatly.49 Indeed, it has even been suggested that reaction to pain may 
Some individuals build to a crisis state, which demands the occurrence of an event 
~~~~~~~~b~~~~~~~~~ 
note 32, passim; Engel, supra, at 908; Hirschfeld &: Behan, supra, at 193-94. 
42. See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNlTIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
43. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 64. 
44. Blitz &: Dinnerstein, Role of Attentional Focus in Pain Perception: Manipulatio11 
of Response ta Noxious Stimulation by Instructions, 77 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 42 
(1971); Woodrow, Friedman, Siegelaub &: Collen, Pain Tolerance: Differences Accord-
ing to Age, Sex, and Race, 34 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 548 (1972). But see Clark &: Mehl, 
supra note 22, at 202 (older women had a higher pain threshold than men or young 
women). 
45. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 72-73; Woodrow, Friedman, Sicgelaub &: Collen, 
supra note 44. But see Clark &: Mehl, supra note 22, at 208. 
46. R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 74; Woodrow, Friedman, Siegelaub &: Collen, 
supra note 44. Cf. Ripley, supra note 34, at 148. 
47. Woodrow, Friedman, Siegelaub &: Collen, supra note 44. 
48. H. MlmsKEY &: F. Sl>EAR, supra note 6, at 103. 
49. V. CAssINARI &: C. PAGNI, CENTRAL PAIN 3-4 (1969); Engel, supra note 26, at 902: 
Melzack &: Chapman, supra note 14, at 70; Ripley, supra note 34, at 143-44; Smith, 
supra note 22, at 190. 
June 1974] Compensation for Pain 1365 
vary with birth order in the family, depending upon the family's 
socioeconomic group.50 
In short, recent observations establish that pain is a social and 
psychological as well as physiological phenomenon. In the past there 
has been too much reliance solely upon surgical and other physiologi-
cal attempts to cure chronic pain. Because of the various bases of 
pain, it can best be treated by a multidisciplinary approach. New 
procedures may provide a cure for psychogenic pain that cannot be 
eliminated by traditional methods.51 
One must not conclude, however, that psychogenic pain does not 
involve the sensations associated with physiologically caused pain. 
Psychogenic pain produces actual discomfort and thus is not imagin-
ary or unreal. 52 A person who suffers psychogenic pain should be 
distinguished from a malingerer; a malingerer does not suffer pain, 
but consciously engages in behavior designed to deceive observers 
into believing that he does. Indeed, psychogenic pain may, like other 
50. H. 1-fuRSKEY &: F. SPEAR, supra note 6, at 73. 
51. A recently developed procedure for the treatment of chronic pain, and one 
probably better designed for relief of psychogenic pain than others, is operant con-
ditioning. See R. BERNI &: w. FORDYCE, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION AND THE NURSING 
PROCESS (in press); E. REEsE, THE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN OPERANT BEHAVIOR 49-63 (1966); 
Fordyce, supra note 31; Fordyce, Fowler, Lehmann &: DeLateur, Some Implications of 
Leaming in Problems of Chronic Pain, 21 J. CHRONIC DISEASE 179 (1968). Operant 
conditioning for the management of chronic pain involves "(1) identification and 
elimination of positive reinforcers to the pain behavior, (2) increase in physical 
activity, and (3) gradual decrease in and eventual elimination of intake of analgesics 
and other drugs." Fordyce, supra, at 125. The rewards for pain are diminished or 
eliminated; rewards for healthy or normal activity are substituted. Pain-related 
behavior is then abandoned in favor of behavior that is reinforced. 
In recognition of the interpersonal aspects of pain, members of the family may 
be involved in the treatment. This is consistent with the view that pain is frequently 
the family's pain rather than the sole property of the patient. Family members are 
instructed not to give positive reinforcement to pain behavior by elaborate demon-
strations of concern, but instead to reinforce activities and behaviors that are con-
sistent with a return to a healthy absence of pain. In some cases, family members 
may reassess the_ir relationship with the patient and identify the reasons that led them 
to reinforce pain behavior. Bonica, Fundamental Considerations of Chronic Pain 
Therapy, 53 PosrGRAD. MED., May 1973, at 83, 85; Fordyce, supra note 31, at 128; 
Fordyce, Fowler, Lehmann &: DeLateur, supra, at 180-83. See also AbrolllS, Fellner &: 
Whitaker, The Family Enters the Hospital, 127 AM.. J. PSYCHIATRY 1363 (1971) 
(psychiatric patients). 
Other methods for treating chronic pain are also being developed, utilizing what 
has been learned about attention, anxiety, depression, and conditioning. Melzack &: 
Chapman, supra note 14. Experiences of soldiers in combat and athletes in contact 
games combine with the gate theory of pain to suggest that attentional processes can 
be used to control pain. For example, a method known as Alpha feedback training 
combines the use of distraction of attention from a painful body site, strong or 
hypnotic suggestions, and relaxation of anxieties. The technique develops a sense of 
control over pain and reduces both anxiety and pain. Melzack &: Chapman, supra, 
at 73-75. 
52, J. BoNICA, supra note 22, at 134-37; H. 1-fuRSKEY &: F. SPEAR, supra note 6, 
at 25, 85-86; Fordyce, supra note 31, at 123-24; Szasz, supra note 27, at 99-100. 
1366 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:1355 
pain, eventually produce physical deterioration of the sufferer's body. 
Psychophysiologic processes such as restriction of nasal passages or 
elevation of blood pressure may over time become biologically de-
structive, 53 and muscle tension alone may produce a substance that is 
toxic to living cells. 54 Among the most perverse risks of physical harm 
from psychogenic pain are unnecessary surgery and drug addiction. 0° 
The simple acknowledgment that psychogenic pain exists does not 
in itself justify an exploration of its legal significance. Problems of 
proof abound in determining the source of pain, and determination 
of whether pain is psychological or physiological is not a simple 
matter. For instance, one study reveals that twenty-five to thirty-five 
per cent of patients with pain from surgical operations or other 
organic sources receive the same relief from a placebo as from a 
narcotic. 56 If psychogenic pain patients are only a nominal portion of 
all persons with chronic pain, the need for certainty might make it 
preferable to apply one rule to all cases. 
Despite its importance, the amount of research on chronic pain 
has been relatively small, and there are still large gaps in our knowl-
edge about it.57 It appears, however, that chronic pain has three main 
causes: (1) persistent, peripheral noxious stimulation; (2) disease of 
the cerebral-spinal axis; and (3) operant mechanisms.08 The first 
category includes arthritis, herniated disks, ulcers, cancer, and 
coronary artery disease-the resultant pains have substantial organic 
or physiological bases. The second category consists of diseases or 
disorders of cranial or spinal nerves, sometimes referred to as various 
forms of neuralgia. 59 Third category pain may be initiated by noxious 
stimulation, but it is so reinforced through operant conditioning6° 
that it becomes independent of its organic or physiological base. Doc-
tor John Bonica, a leading investigator of the phenomenon of pain, 
53. J. BoNICA, supra note 22, at 149-50. 
54. J. BoNICA, supra note 22, at 151; Rodbard, Muscle Pain, in PAIN AND SUFFERING, 
supra note 9, at 154. 
55. Melzack &: Chapman, supra note 14, at 72. 
56. Bonica, supra note 51, at 83-84. 
The psychological aspects of pain are not limited to the patient. The physician 
who feels a professional obligation to cure may react to a patient's persistent failure 
to respond to treatment with hostility, making impossible the rapport that might 
bring about a success. Behan &: Hirschfield, The Accident Process (pt. 2), 186 J.A.M.A. 
300, 301-03 (1963). On the other hand, the physician may attempt to save face by 
adopting his patient'(! view that the pain is severe and incurable. 
57. Bonica, Introduction to Symposium on Management of Pain, 53 POSTGRAD, l\:IED,, 
May 1973, at 56, 57. 
58. Bonica, supra note 51, at 82. 
59. See Loeser, Neuralgia, 53 POSTGRAD. MED., May 1973, at 207. 
60. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra. 
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states that operant mechanisms are "among the most common causes 
of chronic pain and prolonged disability."61 Hubert Winston Smith, 
a lawyer and doctor, states that most neurologists agree that very few 
traumatic injuries produce permanent pain.62 The noted psychiatrist 
Thomas Szasz ·writes that one thing that strikes the careful observer 
of patients with chronic pain is that such patients have made a career 
of suffering.63 Another psychiatrist, George Engel, suggests that 
symptoms that deviate from anatomical and physiological principles 
governing pathological pain should immediately caution the physi-
cian that peripheral nerve impulses play no role or that their influ-
ence is being obscured by other factors.64 
The current medical views of pain-in particular the gate con-
trol theory-thus pose obvious and direct challenges to the physio-
logical basis of pain that tort law seems to assume. The degree, dura-
tion, and even the existence of a claimant's pain may be determined 
by matters other than noxious stimulation of peripheral nerves. The 
relationship bea\Teen injury and pain therefore may be entirely dif-
ferent from the assumed relationship that underlies the conclusion 
that a tortfeasor should compensate a claimant for pain experienced 
61. Bonica, supra note 51, at 82. 
62. Smith, supra note 22, at 191; Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury 
Cases, 14 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 586, 610 (1953). 
63. Szasz, supra note 27, at 97. 
64. Engel, supra note 26, at 903. Two other doctors, who conducted a study of 
approximately 300 cases of industrial accidents and injuries, give similar advice, 
stating that except when clearly explained by normal responses to anatomical defects, 
chronicity in injury cases should be considered psychogenic unless proved othenvise. 
Behan &: Hirschfield, supra note 56, at 303. In another study of 200 patients receiving 
or seeking compensation as a result of work-incurred disability, it was noted that 
the patients had common personality characteristics that resulted in a state of crisis 
of tension on the job preceding the incapacitating event. Brodsky, supra note 32, 
at 528-29. The patients' view of how severely they had been injured frequently was 
distorted by their inability to remember realistically what their life situation had 
been before the injury; they substituted the situation remembered from the prime 
of their lives. See Fellner, supra note 41, at 348; Miller &: Fellner, supra note 41, 
at 186. Another psychiatrist who has served as a consultant in cases of prolonged 
incapacitation from industrial injuries notes that medically the most characteristic 
aspect of the referred patients' symptomatology is the gross discrepancy between the 
organic impairment and the disability exhibited. Fellner, supra, at 348. Dr. Richard 
Sternbach, another authority on pain, has noted that there is no dependable relation-
ship between pathological injury and the degree of pain experienced. R. STERNBACH, 
supra note 6, at 27. He and others have identified a type of chronic low back pain 
sufferer, whom they have characterized as the "low back loser," for whose pain the 
causes do not appear to be primarily organic. Sternbach, Murphy, Akeson &: Wolf, 
supra note 30. The same appears to be true for man's most common complaint, 
the headache. Friedman, Headache, 53 PoSTGRAD. MED., May 1973, at 172, 178. Indeed, 
Dr. Seymour Diamond, a headache expert at the University of Chicago, estimates 
that nine out of ten headaches are due to emotions and other psychological factors; 
only ten per cent have an underlying organic cause. Kotulak, Pain Learned?, Detroit 
Free Press, July 22, 1974, § C, at 1, cols. 1-3. 
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after injury. The desirability of requiring compensation for pain thus 
deserves re-examination. 
III. THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CURRENT MEDICAL Vmws 
The significance of the current medical views of pain for the law 
governing compensation of accident victims depends upon the pur-
poses that that law seeks to serve and how well present rules govern-
ing compensation fulfill those purposes. The principal objective of 
tort law has been considered to be providing such compensation to 
an innocent victim of an injury wrongfully caused by another as 
will return the victim to the position in which he would have been 
but for the wrongdoing. Other objectives include those of punishing 
the wrongdoer, eliminating the need for retaliation or violent self-
help, and deterring ·wrongful conduct. 65 
Recently, however, commentators have perceived these traditional 
objectives as subordinate to an overriding social goal of properly al-
locating risks and resources. I£ the law allows recovery in a given 
case, it transfers the cost of the injury from the victim to others; if 
the law does not allow recovery, it allocates the cost to the victim. 
Recognition of this loss allocation function has produced a body of 
literature in which principles of tort law have been subjected to 
economic analysis in an attempt to improve their social efficacy.00 
Some commentators have concluded that pain and suffering 
awards do not serve any of the objectives of tort law to a degree that 
justifies the current generous levels of compensation. Thus, Professor 
Plant's excellent survey of damages for pain and suffering awarded 
in personal injury cases led him to conclude that juries often awarded 
disproportionately large amounts and that such awards were difficult 
for courts to control because of the absence of definitive principles.67 
He suggested that an upper limit for pain and suffering recoveries 
be established at fifty per cent of the victim's medical, nursing, and 
hospital expenses.68 Impressed by similar proposals for reformulation 
65. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). 
66. See, e.g., G. CAI.ABRESI, THE CoSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Brown, Toward an 
Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 323 (1973); Calabresi & Hirschoff, 
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. I.Aw & EcoN. I (1960); Lave, Safety in Transportation: 
The Role of the Government, 33 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 512 (1968); Regan, The 
Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J. I.Aw & EcoN. 427 (1972); Vickery, Automobile 
Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance, 33 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 429 
(1968). The purposes of the law allocating costs of accidents might be to provide an 
accurate accounting, to fix the prices of various types of activities, or to ensure 
valid wide-scale economic decisions. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra. 
67. Plant, supra note 1, at 210. 
68. Id. at 211. 
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of the law of damages advanced by Dean Leon Green69 and Professor 
Fleming James,70 Professor Clarence Morris concurred in the sug-
gestion that a change be made, with the addenda that recoveries 
should be allowed when pain has disabling economic consequences 
and that the change be made by the legislature.71 His review of cases 
led him to conclude that it was erroneous to view the law as provid-
ing pocket money to buy distractions from pain, appealing as that 
view might be.12 
Despite their cogency, the arguments of the commentators have 
not resulted in a general reduction or elimination of recoveries for 
pain. The new medical evidence provides an additional argument for 
limiting or excluding such awards, at least in cases in which no 
physiological basis for pain exists. The current understanding of pain 
reinforces legislative decisions to omit compensation for pain from 
statutory accident reparation plans. The new understanding of pain 
may also persuade judges to limit recoveries for pain, perhaps by dis-
tinguishing psychogenic pain from other items more properly com-
pensated. 
A. The Role of Pain and Suffering Damages 
in the Tort Law System 
The propriety of awarding damages specifically for pain and 
suffering under the tort law system did not receive close attention 
until the middle of the nineteenth century.73 By that time the law 
had come to rely heavily upon the principle of negligence for al-
locating responsibility for accidental injuries, and damages for pain 
and suffering had been allowed in enough cases to give the matter 
the appearance of being well-settled. The concept of requiring a 
·wrongdoer to compensate for pain and suffering an innocent party 
whom he has injured had a recognizable appeal in the earlier 
trespass action, in which no distinction was made between intended 
and unintended consequences.74 The propriety of awarding such 
69, L. GREEN, TRAFFIC V1cnMS-TORT LAW AND INSURANCE 88 (1958). 
'70. James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REv. 293, 
297 (1958). 
'71. Morris, supra note 1, at 476. 
'72. Id. at 479. 
73. O'Connell & 13ailey, The History of Payment for Pain and Suffering, in J. 
O'CONNELL & R. SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN & SUFFERING 83, 94-100 (1972). 
74. See Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. R.Ev. 359, 
362-65 (1951); Malone, Rumination on the Role of Fault in the History of Torts, 
in U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE 
AcnoN 1, 1-33 (1970); Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 
46 WASH, L. REv. 225 (1971). 
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damages for unintended harm under the negligence standard thus 
never received the consideration it deserved. The lack of a well-
established liability insurance industry at that time at least ensured 
that it was the negligent party who actually paid the damages for 
pain and suffering. The rule excluding evidence in the trial of a 
tort action as to whether a defendant is insured has preserved the 
appearance that it is the defendant who pays. In fact, however, today 
the defendant seldom pays pain and suffering damages personally, 
because the uninsured defendant is not likely to be sued.70 It is other 
people who provide through liability insurance premiums the funds 
from which the pain and suffering damages are paid. The concept of 
a wrongdoer making amends to the injured party for the unpleasant 
experience to which he was subjected no longer justifies the payment 
of damages for pain and suffering. 
The best explanation of what society now does in awarding 
damages for pain and suffering appears to be that advanced by Pro-
fessor Jaffe: Society is showing its concern for one =who has suffered 
an affront to his personality and bodily integrity by offering "a con-
solation, a solatium."76 Perhaps the consolation or solatium flows as 
much to society as it does to the accident victim. Members of society 
may rest easier when they contemplate the possibility that they 
might suffer a similar fate, and they need no longer be concerned 
with the victim's unfortunate condition because "justice" has been 
done. 
One may question, however, whether a consolation should be 
awarded to one whose pain is psychogenic or preserved by operant 
mechanisms. Even if there were a general social fund dedicated to 
alleviating the unsought sorrows and tribulations of life generally, 
the legitimacy of compensating such pain would be problematical. • 
But the source of the victim's compensation in tort litigation is not a 
fund created to assist persons in making social adjustments at home 
or at work. Moreover, it is possible that the offering of such con-
solations may, by providing incentives and reinforcement for pain 
behavior, serve to increase the pain experienced by those who are to 
be consoled. Other members of society have no need for either the 
assurance that they will be treated similarly or a release from con-
cern for the person suffering psychogenic pain. 
75. The Michigan Automobile Accident Survey indicated that only 1.2% of tort 
liability payments come from uninsured sources. A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATI', 
C. VoTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT Cosrs AND PAYMENTS 48, 50 n.54 
(1964) [hereinafter ACCIDENT Cosrs]. 
76. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 222-25. 
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In any event, awards for pain are currently made under the tort 
system in circumstances in which the victim cannot receive or ap-
preciate the consolation. Thus awards have been made for pain suf-
fered by persons who died very soon after being injured,77 and to an 
infant who recovered completely during the first year of life from a 
serious infection caused soon after birth.78 The assumption in 
modem American society sometimes seems to be that everything has a 
money equivalent, but a short period of reflection leads all but the 
most jaded to a contrary conclusion. If we are to use money as a 
consolation we should be sure that we have given the consolation be-
cause the circumstances are appropriate, and not because everything 
has a money equivalent.18 
As Jaffe noted, so the argument that a consolation be awarded a 
victim is most valid in cases of disfigurement or loss of a member. 
That aspect of the tort compensation scheme will not be significantly 
affected by the new medical views because most of that compensation 
is now given under the heading of mental suffering rather than 
pain.81 Some of the pain associated with disfigurement or loss of a 
?7. E.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain &: S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915). 
?8. Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P .2d 880, 103 Cal. 
Rptr. 856 (1970). 
?9. Some insight into the use of money as a consolation in our culture may be 
obtained from observation of a primitive culture that uses no money or significant 
form of wealth. The stone age natives of the New Guinea highlands pursue what to 
us is a gruesome and senseless ceremony if a warrior is killed in battle. Fingers are 
cut from the hands of little girls and cremated and buried with the body of the 
warrior. See R. GARDNER &: K. HEIDER, GARDENS OF WAR 95-96 (1969). Among the motiva-
tions for such conduct must be the attempt to give group recognition to the seriousness 
of the death. My anthropologist friends inform me that in pursuing this practice a 
concern is shown for its effect on the primitive economy, so that it is the less useful 
ring fingers and little fingers that are severed. Would a native of New Guinea-
assuming he could be informed about our practices of giving money for pain-be 
better able to understand our practice than we do theirs? 
80. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 224. 
81. The law has generally made no clear distinction between pain and suffering. 
2 F. HARPER&: F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1322 (1956); C. McCoru.ncK, DAMAGES 315 
(1935). It has been recognized, however, that for legal purposes the term "pain" is 
more appropriately used in connection with the physical or physiological phenomenon, 
whereas "suffering" is more appropriately used in connection with the mental or 
emotional response to injuries and their probable significance for the future enjoy-
ment of life. C. McCORMICK, supra, at 315; 22 AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 105 (1965); 
4 REsrATEllIBNT OF TORTS § 905 (1939). "Suffering" thus includes a wide variety of 
reactions to physical injury, such as fear, worry, and anxiety about future health, 
embarrassment and humiliation about disfignrement or disabilities, depression, and 
resultant functional mental disturbance. In assessing the damages to be awarded for 
suffering consideration may be given to the inability to engage in sports or other 
recreational or family activities, the inability to perform customary household chores, 
and in general the inability to pursue the normal activities of life. Downie v. United 
States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1966); Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 
F.2d ?97 (2d Cir. 1961); Hanson v. Reiss S.S. Co., 184 F. Supp. 545 (D. Del. 1960); 
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member may be psychogenic, but if the burden of proof lies with the 
defendant it is unlikely that juries will decide any but the clearest 
cases against the victim. 
Another suggested function of the present law of damages is com-
pensation for pain as a noneconomic loss. This theory is of dubious 
value even without consideration of the new medical evidence. It 
assumes that the degree of pain that the victim suffers determines 
the amount of money that he receives. In practice, however, while 
any payment to the plaintiff will provide some consolation for his 
noneconomic injury, the amount recovered depends upon a variety 
of factors other than the degree of harm done. 82 
The concept that awarding damages deters the victim or others 
acting for him from taking retaliatory action may be served by the 
award of damages in cases of intentional wrongdoing, but it does not 
provide a compelling rationale for awarding damages for pain suf-
fered because of unintentional injuries. A lawsuit claiming damages 
for pain may reflect hostility, but it is more likely pursued for 
financial gain. This common sense judgment is fortified by a study 
indicating that at the time of injury most automobile accident 
victims do not expect that they will be compensated for their pain.83 
The same study also revealed remarkably little resentment on the 
part of traffic victims toward other parties involved in the accident, 
and the possibility of recovery for pain and suffering produced very 
Vastano v. Partownership Brovigtank, 158 F. Supp. 477 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). See also 
Dugas v. Kansas City S. Ry. Lines, 473 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1973). Substantial damages 
for suffering may thus be obtained even though physical pain has ceased or is 
minimal. Miller v. Thomas, 234 S.2d 67 (La. Ct. App. 1970), modified, 258 La, 285, 
246 S.2d 16 (1971); Guillory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 96 S.2d 866 (La. Ct. App. 1957); 
Vascoe v. Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 S.2d 541 (1951). Moreover, damages for mental 
suffering may be recovered even though the plaintiff's preexisting mental condition 
made him particularly susceptible to an adverse psychological reaction to physical 
injury. Leatherman v. Gateway Transp. Co., 331 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1964); Feeley v. 
United States, 220 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
The mental aspect of suffering is illustrated by one court's holding that damages 
for suffering may be reduced in light of the plaintiff's lack of comprehension or 
the ability to be rationally cognizant of his suffering. Helms v. United States, 231 
F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Tex. 1964). 
Although pain can be distingnished from suffering, a strong relationship between 
the tlvo may exist in some cases. Thus, as mentioned above, see text accompanying 
notes 37-38 supra, the persistent phantom pains experienced by amputees arc probably 
psychogenic and may be related to embarrassment or gnilt over unacceptable dcpen• 
dcncy needs. Likewise, the suffering that one experiences because of physical dis• 
abilities or disfiguring scars may well be affected by the reactions of family, friends, 
or work companions, in a manner comparable to the way in which such reactions 
establish operant pain mechanisms. 
82. See ACCIDENT Cosrs, supra note 75, at 209-21; Adams, Economic-Financial Con• 
sequences of Personal Injuries, 7 EcoN. &: Bus. BULL. 5, 73 (1955). 
83. See note 111 infra. 
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little change in attitude. 84 Society has even less reason to deter 
retaliation by sufferers of psychogenic pain. If the victim "needs" 
his pain to achieve desired social adjustments he is not likely to attack 
the person who gave him what he wanted. 
The concept that liability for damages deters parties from dan-
gerous and harmful conduct is of limited applicability to cases in-
volving unintended consequences. The random and questionable 
effect on the conduct of tortfeasors of liability for pain and suffering 
is apparent without consideration of the new medical views of pain. 
Those views give added emphasis to the unpredictability of the 
amount of damages that may be awarded if conduct results in pain-
ful injury, thus eliminating such awards from consideration as con-
trolled regulators of conduct. 
A final and desperate rationalization for pain and suffering 
damages is that they compensate the victim for economic losses that 
are not othenvise fully met. Some have noted that remuneration for 
a plaintiff's out-of-pocket losses do not fully return him to the posi-
tion he would have occupied but for the tort because his award 
makes no provision for inflation or attorney's fees. Thus, it is argued 
that pain and suffering damages are proper because they make up 
for these uncompensated losses.85 
This defense of pain and suffering damages evokes a myriad of 
responses. It is unsound even without considering the new medical 
evidence. First, implicit in the suggestion that recoveries for pain 
properly indemnify economic losses lies the admission that they are 
not intended to compensate for noneconomic losses. Second, the sug-
gestion that pain and suffering damages may properly be used to pay 
attorney's fees is disingenuous. The American judicial system has 
established that, except in specific instances,86 successful parties may 
84. J. O'CONNELL&: R. SIMON, supra note 73, at 26-27. 
85. See, e.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 364 P.2d 337, 
15 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1961) (pain and suffering awards pay for attorney's fees not other-
wise compensated). 
86. For example, successful plaintiffs may recover attorney's fees in antitrust 
actions, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act cases, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 
(1970); Merchant Marine Act cases, 46 U.S.C. § 1228 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act 
cases, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970); and Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act cases, 
7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970), among others. The grant of attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party is left to the discretion of the court in copyright cases, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970); 
patent infringement suits, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970); and cases arising under the Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970). Also, attorney's fees are commonly recoverable as costs in a 
variety of state actions, including those for libel, slander, and the enforcement of 
mechanics' liens. See generally Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical 
Development, 38 U. Coto. L. REv. 202 (1966); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 911 (1949). 
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not recover litigation costs. There may be cogent arguments against 
the general rule, but if injured plaintiffs deserve to recover at-
torney's fees, the fees should be awarded to them on that basis, so 
that they receive neither more nor less than full compensation for 
those expenses. 
Pain and suffering damages reveal their most serious lack of 
justification if one considers the overriding objective of tort law to 
be a proper allocation of risks and resources. Misallocations occur for 
two reasons: Transactional costs produce irrational distributions, 
and costs are not allocated on a justifiable basis. Awarding compen-
sation for pain and suffering almost certainly produces economic 
distortions because it gives weight to a factor-pain-that has no 
definite economic measure. The distortions grow because pain is 
highly variable and the procedures for fixing its economic weight in 
given cases-for example, jury trials-are so expensive that there is a 
great incentive to avoid using them. 
Focusing on accurate cost accounting, the question arises whether 
the cost of pain-and especially the cost of psychogenic pain-is 
more appropriately allocated to one of life's activities that may have 
a more significant causal relation to the pain than the defendant's 
tortious conduct.87 The import of the new medical evidence on the 
accuracy of cost accounting is discussed below, in the context of 
investigating legislative attempts to allocate damages to one or 
another precipitating activity. 88 However, some variations of the 
allocation argument should be dealt with first. 
Professors Blum and Kalven have challenged the efficacy of any 
attempted reallocation by suggesting that critics of compensation for 
pain and suffering have mistakenly considered it as a specific item of 
damage added by a judge or a jury to medical expenses and economic 
losses.89 They suggest that if pain and suffering recoveries were 
87. The concern for maintaining accurate cost accounting is not as great under 
the negligence principle as it might be under other principles of liability. The 
negligence principle assumes the reallocation of accident costs will occur only when 
these costs are caused by a failure to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent 
person and are not the normal incidents of an activity. Moreover, even if we were 
to pursue a policy of proper allocation of resources and could prove that such a 
system required satisfaction of economic losses from accidents, we could not be 
certain that such a result would be ensured by eliminating pain and suffering damages, 
Nevertheless, there is a concern about the justice done by a system that, as will be 
seen, leaves demonstrable economic losses uncompensated while a substantial amount 
of the available economic resources are paid for an elusive item having no readily 
ascertainable market value. 
88. See text accompanying note 108 infra. 
89. W. BLUM &: H. KAI.VEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM 
35 (1965). 
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disallowed damage awards might remain as high as they are now, 
because juries search for a sum that corresponds ·with the dignitary 
aspects of injuries and do not add compensation for pain to what 
would othenvise be an appropriate award.90 Thus, an attempt to re-
allocate resources by eliminating damages for pain would fail, as 
juries would simply increase the award in other categories. 
Ali Professor Kalven himself has noted,91 however, the popular 
supposition is that juries are responsive to claims for compensation 
for pain. And even if Blum and Kalven are correct about jury be-
havior, lawyers assume that pain and suffering claims are of signif-
icance to the jury, and they almost certainly act in accord with those 
assumptions when they negotiate settlements. Moreover, it is un-
likely that a jury would deal with the dignitary aspects of an injury if 
it had not first compensated for economic loss. It is not sensible to 
do something of doubtful efficacy while leaving undone something 
that would more certainly further a desired objective. Juries may be 
trusted to see that compensation of demonstrated economic losses 
more certainly returns the injured victim to his position before the 
accident than does the payment of damages for pain. 
While increased damages for pain and suffering have achieved 
greatest publicity in the few cases in which enormous amounts have 
been awarded,92 they have had their major effect upon the pattern of 
compensation awards in the much more numerous cases in which 
smaller amounts have been recovered. The result has been an egre-
gious misallocation of resources in that the substantial economic losses 
of some parties remain unsatisfied while other parties recover 
amounts vastly in excess of their relatively small economic losses.93 
90. If so, juries are acting in a manner consistent with Professor Jaffe's suggestion 
that damages for pain and suffering function as a solatium for the victim. See text 
accompanying note 76 supra. 
91. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Omo 
ST. L.J. 158, 170 (1958). 
92. See C. GREGORY &: H. KAI.VEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 546-47 (2d ed. 
1969). 
93. A study conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation indicates that 
while persons with economic losses of $1,000 or less received 46% of all tort payment 
dollars, those persons incurred only 33% of the economic losses. Ninety-three per cent 
of the payment dollars went to persons with economic losses of $10,000 or less,. while 
they suffered only 84% of the economic losses. U.S. DEFT. OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR 
VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1971) 
[hereinafter CRASH LoSSEs]. See also Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and 
the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 
l (1961). The misallocation of resources seems even greater in cases involving death 
or serious injuries. The tort system provided a recovery of 4.5 times economic losses 
for persons suffering losses of less than $500, whereas victims who had suffered 
economic losses of $25,000 or more recovered only 30% of their losses. CRASH LoSSEs, 
supra, at 36. Serious injury was defined to be an injury that resulted in medical 
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The explanation for this misallocation of funds to pain and suffering 
rather than economic losses lies in the dynamics of the out-of-court 
settlements that govern almost all liability cases.04 
Limits on liability under insurance policies are undoubtedly a 
very significant factor in producing the incomplete compensation of 
the largest economic claims. Of greater importance in determining 
where the available resources go is the fact that from the defense 
side it may be wise to settle a case without the expense of careful 
investigation and evaluation. Particularly, it makes sense from a busi-
ness viewpoint for insurance companies to buy up small claims-
those that involve little or no economic loss-at a relatively low 
price, thus avoiding the possibility of large judgments for pain and 
suffering. Consequently, out of the 44 cents of the liability insurance 
premium dollar that finally reaches automobile accident victims, 
21.5 cents is used to pay general damages, such as pain and suffering, 
leaving only 22.5 cents for compensation of economic losses.0u 
One may protest, however, that in the dynamics of negotiation 
the threat of substantial damages for pain and suffering is necessary 
to force compensation for economic losses. But, as indicated above, 
the threat has not worked for those who suffer the most serious harm 
and it appears to have worked too well for those who do not have 
substantial economic losses. In any event, the integrity of the law is 
not served by permitting recovery for the alleged purpose of changing 
the balance of power in negotiations. It would be far more direct and 
efficacious to change the balance of bargaining power by allowing 
recovery of attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, or interest on sums 
ultimately found due. 
B. Legislative Allocation: Automobile Accident 
Reparation Plans 
Drastic proposals for revision of the tort law system have been 
made in the various no-fault plans that have been proposed and even 
adopted in a number of states.06 Probably the most controversial 
costs (excluding hospital costs) of $500 or more, or two weeks or more of hospital-
ization, or, if working, three weeks or more of missed work, or, if not working, six 
weeks or more of missed normal activity. 1 U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, EcONOIIIIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES 17 (1970). Persons who suffered only 
7% of the economic losses in death or serious accident cases received 27% of the 
net tort payments. CRASH LoSSES, supra, at 40. 
94. See CRASH LoSSEs, supra note 93, at 37. 
95. Id. at 51-52. Of the 22.5 cents used to compensate for economic losses, 8 cents 
is duplicative of payments from other sources, leaving only 14.5 cents for otherwise 
uncompensated economic losses. Id, 
96. Several states have enacted automobile accident reparation laws that bar 
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aspect of no-fault automobile accident reparation plans has been 
the elimination or drastic limitation of compensation for pain and 
suffering. Hence, the new medical views of pain are of great signif-
icance for an appraisal of the provisions found in the automobile ac-
cident reparation plans. It is in legislatures, rather than courts, that 
general principles may properly be framed for the majority of cases. 
The pertinent provision of the proposed Hart-Magnuson Na-
tional No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act currently reads as fol-
lows: 
A person remains liable for damages for noneconomic detriment 
in excess of $2,500, if the accident results in 
(A) death, serious and permanent disfigurement, or other serious 
and permanent injury; or 
(B) more than ninety continuous days of total disability. As used 
in this subparagraph, "total disability" means medically de-
terminable physical or mental impairment which prevents 
the victim from performing all or substantially all of the 
material acts and duties which constitute his usual and cus-
tomary daily activities.97 
The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation Act proposed 
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws contains a comparable 
limitation on tort liability: 
Tort liability ·with respect to accidents occurring in this State and 
arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle 
is abolished except as to: 
(7) damages in excess of [$5,000] for non-economic detriment, but 
only if the accident causes death, significant permanent injury, seri-
ous permanent disfigurement, or more than 6 months of complete 
inability of the injured person to work in an occupation. "Complete 
inability of an injured person to work in an occupation" means in-
ability to perform, on even a part-time basis, even some of the 
duties required by his occupation or, if unemployed at the time of 
recovery of damages for pain and suffering in cases not involving impairment of 
bodily function or serious permanent disfigurement, unless the medical and hospital 
bills necessary for treatment of the injury exceed a fixed dollar figure. See, e.g., CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-323(a)(7) (Supp. 1973) (.$400); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(2) 
(Supp. 1973) ($1,000); KAN. STAT • .ANN. § 40-3117(b) (1973) ($500); MAss. ANN. LAws 
ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1973) (.$500); N.Y. !Ns. LAw §§ 671(4)(b), 673(1) (McKinney Supp. 
1973-74) ($500). 
Part of the Florida provision establishing a threshold for recovery of pain and 
suffering damages was recently ruled unconstitutional by the Florida supreme court. 
See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 42,856 (April 17, 1974). 
97. National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 
§ 206(a)(5) (1974) (passed in the Senate on May 1, 1974, 120 CONG. R.Ec. 60). 
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the injury, any occupation for which the injured person was quali-
fied. 98 
The Michigan no-fault motor vehicle insurance act permits re-
covery under tort law for noneconomic loss " ... only if the injured 
party has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or 
permanent serious disfigurement."99 
The reluctance to allow recovery for pain and suffering expressed 
in these proposals is not a response to the new medical evidence dis-
cussed here. In part the exclusion of compensation for pain reflects 
the understanding that such claims are weaker under a no-fault 
system because the victim's recovery is no longer grounded on the 
presence of a culpable defendant.100 Also, to some extent the reluc-
tance to allow such compensation is motivated by a concern for the 
fiscal viability of the no-fault system and the difficulty and expense 
of assessing the proper amount of compensation for pain and suffer-
ing.101 The world is not perfect, and the difficulties created by small 
claims for pain and suffering provide a justification for settling for 
less than an exquisite perfection in compensating such claims. Pain 
endured over a long period of time is obviously a matter of greater 
concern. Here the new medical views of pain may make a valuable 
contribution in formulating plans. 
Although the medical data do not permit precise statement of 
what proportion of chronic pain has no organic or physiological 
basis, the proportion is apparently quite substantial.102 Operant 
mechanisms are among the most common causes of chronic pain.103 
Knowledge that chronic pain is likely to be psychogenic or preserved 
by operant mechanisms may reduce the sympathy or concern that 
98. UNIFORM MOTOR VEmCLE ACCIDENT REPARATION ACT § 5(a}(7). "Non-economic 
detriment" is defined in section l(a)(9} of the Act to mean ", •• pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, physical impairment, and other nonpecuniary damage recoverable 
under the tort law of the State. The term does not include punitive or exemplary 
damages." 
99. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 500.3135 (Supp. 1973). 
100. See Jaffe, supra note 1, at 235; James, supra note 70, at 297. This consider-
ation has provided a major argument for elimination of pain and suffering com-
pensation from no-fault automobile accident reparation plans. See, e.g., R. KEETON &: 
J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 359-61 (1965). See also 
L GREEN, supra note 69, at 88. 
101. That determination of the amount of compensation that should be given 
for pain and suffering is a substantial obstacle to settlement of claims under the 
existing tort system is clearly indicated by the Michigan automobile injury survey. 
Sixty-six per cent of both claimants and defense lawyers designated it as a cause of 
disagreement causing a trial and seventeen per cent of both groups of lawyers desig-
nated it as the first ranking factor. ACCIDENT Cosrs, supra note 82, at 214-15, 
102. See note 64 supra and text accompanying notes 57-64 supra. 
103. See text accompanying note 61 supra. 
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some persons would otherwise feel for the accident victim. More 
important, it indicates that compensation for pain cannot with 
confidence be assessed as a cost properly allocated to the activity of 
driving automobiles,1°4 and that it may therefore properly be elimi-
nated from a no-fault plan. 
If chronic pain usually is suffered only by certain persons and if 
it is caused or preserved by operant mechanisms that function only 
because of interpersonal problems in family, work, or other social 
relationships, it is a cost more properly allocated to the activities or 
forces causing the stress in the victim's life than to automobile 
transportation. Indeed, if the pain is caused or preserved by operant 
mechanisms-if it is in fact "needed" or "desired"-it is likely that 
some other · event would soon have triggered a career of suffering. 
There may be a cause-in-fact relationship between the automobile 
accident and the initial pain, but it is not an adequate basis for re-
quiring users of automobiles to provide compensation for the victim's 
ongoing experience of self-serving psychogenic pain. 
The latest medical conceptions of pain thus support the limita-
tions on pain and suffering claims found in most automobile accident 
reparation plans. However, the plans do not bar such claims com-
pletely. The extent to which the provisions will prevent recovery for 
psychogenic pain depends upon whether words such as "permanent 
injury" and "serious impairment of body function" are construed 
to require a substantial and identifiable organic or physiological base 
for the injury or impairment. Recoveries for psychogenic pain ·will 
probably be allowed where the pain has impaired body function or 
disabled one from working.105 To the extent that psychogenic pain 
is not properly allocable to the activity of operating automobiles 
these recoveries will improperly charge automobilists. Recoveries 
for psychogenic pain may also be allowed in cases of disfigurement or 
loss of a limb. Despite the mutilation, if tissue destruction or irrita-
tion has ceased, the peripheral nerves no longer receive the stimula-
tion that causes them to send impulses to the central nervous sys-
tem,100 and continued pain is probably psychogenic or produced by 
operant mechanisms.107 Perhaps the physical trauma required to 
produce these injuries, however, makes even psychogenic pain a cost 
properly allocable to the operation of automobiles. 
104. W. BLUM & H. K.ALVEN, supra note 89, at 57-61; G. CALABRESI, supra note 66, 
d13~9~ ' 
105. See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra. 
106. See authorities cited in note 6 supra. See also Bonica, supra note 51, at 82. 
107. See R. STERNBACH, supra note 6, at 131-32. 
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It should be noted that compensation for nonpsychogenic pain 
does not result in a misallocation of costs (assuming the costs can be 
measured). Numerous factors other than the use of an automobile-
some social and some personal-must converge after an accident to 
produce psychogenic pain. For pain that does have a physiological 
basis, however, no such convergence of forces is necessary, and use of 
the automobile remains the dominant factor in the loss suffered. In 
this respect, schemes such as the Michigan act,108 which at least 
requires an initial physiological basis for compensable pain by con-
ditioning the maintenance of tort actions on death, serious impair-
ment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement, may be 
preferred over flat dollar limitations, such as the exclusion of the first 
5,000 dollars of pain and suffering damages under the Basic Protec-
tion Act proposed by Professors Keeton and O'Connell.100 
Even the Michigan act, however, may reflect no more than a 
judgment that persons suffering severe injuries deserve some compen-
sation for pain, and, since it is beyond available economic resources 
to fully compensate such persons without regard to fault, some tort 
actions are preserved. This judgment has the appeal of traditional 
tort law, but if no-fault schemes as a whole are designed to make 
automobile transportation bear only the costs that are properly 
allocable to it, it should be recognized that psychogenic pain is not 
such a cost. Accordingly, the provisions in no-fault plans preserving 
tort recoveries in certain cases should be revised to preclude re-
coveries for psychogenic pain.110 
The new medical evidence proves useful even where tort claims 
are preserved. Knowledge that physiologically-based pain may be 
maintained or magnified by operant mechanisms suggests that there 
should be no dollar thresholds on the amount of pain that must be 
suffered to make compensation possible. The reinforcement power 
of money is obvious, and an injured person may well heighten his 
suffering to qualify for an award.111 
108. See note 99 supra and accompanying text. 
109. PROPOSED MOTOR VEHICLE BASIC PROTECTION INSURANCE Aar § 4.2(1), in R. 
KEETON &: J. O'CONNELL, supra note 100, at 323. 
110. For example, the words "physical injury" could be substituted for the word 
"injury" in provisions saving tort actions, and "physical injury" could be defined to 
mean an injury for which there is an identifiable organic or physiological base. 
111. A survey made by O'Connell and Simon suggests that this should not be a 
matter of great concern. It indicates that only 28 per cent of the persons injured in 
automobile accidents expected at the time of the accidents that they would be 
paid for pain and suffering, and only 34 per cent of those who did not initially 
know about payments made for pain and suffering ever leaned about them. J. 
O'CONNELL &: R. SIMON, supra note 73, at 19-20. Consulting a lawyer did not sig-
nificantly increase awareness of the possibility of obtaining damages for pain; only 
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The converse of this argument is also important. Adoption of a 
no-fault accident reparation plan that permits no recovery for pain 
might actually reduce the pain experienced by accident victims, 
because it would make certain the recovery of economic losses and 
reduce the uncertainties and anxieties that beset an accident victim 
under the tort system. As mentioned above,112 there is little doubt 
that anxiety increases the intensity of pain. True, such anxiety is 
usually about the injury, and is distinguishable from anxiety about 
whether one will be compensated. But the anxieties created by feel-
ing sensation from and viewing a bandaged limb and the anxieties 
about whether the limb will operate well enough to permit one to 
earn a living certainly overlap. If the security that came to soldiers 
on Anzio beachhead from knowing that they would be removed from 
the battle zone could reduce their pain,113 it is not implausible that 
the security of knowing that economic losses will be reimbursed may 
reduce the pain of one who contemplates his economic future. 
Even if compensation is limited to economic loss, the form of 
compensation should be considered in light of the new medical 
evidence. A common feature of automobile reparation plans is reim-
bursement of lost earnings on an installment basis for a stated period 
of time.114 The danger that claimants might malinger in order to 
stretch their eligibility to the maximum is obvious. The same con-
cern exists regarding the provision of the Uniform Act preserving 
36 per cent of those who initially did not know about payments for pain and suffer-
ing and who later consulted a lawyer learned about them, id. at 25, and most of 
those questioned who knew that damages could be awarded for pain and suffering 
said that the possibility of payment had no effect on their pain. Id. at 26. The 
reliability of this last finding, however, diminishes when one considers how unlikely 
it is that a victim would ever admit or know that the possibility of a larger recovery 
had affected his pain. Moreover, the O'Connell and Simon survey involved cases in 
which the median award in litigated cases was only $2004, and the median for all 
cases surveyed only $487. Id. at 16. The survey, therefore, probably does not reflect 
the extent to which claimants become aware of payments for pain and suffering 
in more serious cases or the effect of that knowledge on their pain. In cases involving 
large claims many lawyers probably would inform their clients that their pain is 
an element of damages. In any case, proper preparation by a lawyer of a large 
claim would involve a detailed investigation of the pain experienced by the client 
and hence alert all but the most obtuse to the fact that pain is an important part 
of the claim. That knowledge of payment for pain and suffering affects conduct is 
indicated by the fact that only 24 per cent of all survey respondents consulted a 
lawyer, whereas 40 per cent of those who initially knew about payment for pain 
and suffering did so. Id. at 20. 
112. See text accompanying notes 17-25 supra. 
113. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra. 
114. See, e.g., National No-Fanlt Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, S. 354, 93d Cong., 
1st Sess. § 106A (1973); UNIFORM: MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATION Ac::r § 23 
(1972); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 500.3142 (Supp. 1973); PROPOSED MOTOR VEHICLE 
PROTECl'ION INSURANCE Ac::r, in R. KEETON &: J. O'CONNELL, supra note 100, at 318. 
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tort claims in cases involving a six month inability to work.11u There 
must now be added concern that operant mechanisms and cognitive 
dissonance116 will create or preserve physically disabling pain. Per-
haps lump sum payments, which are permitted, for example, under 
the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation Act,117 would be 
preferable to installment payments. In any case, information compar-
ing the activities of persons receiving lump sum payments and those 
compensated on an installment basis is needed. 
C. Practical Implications of the New Views Under 
Present Tort Law 
I. Psychiatric or Psychological Examination of a Plaintiff 
Absent legislation barring recovery for pain, the new medical 
evidence may have an effect upon the law developed and applied by 
judges and juries.118 If the effect is to be that of limiting compensa-
tion, more will be required than a showing of a generalized possi-
bility that pain sensations are psychogenic. A defendant will have to 
prove through testimony of ex.pert witnesses that the pain suffered by 
a particular plaintiff is psychogenic. 
It may be difficult, however, to find doctors who are sufficiently 
familiar with the new medical views of pain to make an assessment of 
whether a claimant's pain is psychogenic. There are no statistics on 
such a question, but it is likely that most practicing physicians adhere 
to the older, specific pain receptor theory of how pain is reported to 
the brain. Furthermore, the average busy physician is understandably 
115. UNIFORM MOTOR VEIDCLE ACCIDENT REPARATION ACT § 5(a)(6} (1972), 
116. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra. 
117. Section 26 of the Act permits lump sum settlement, not exceeding $2500, 
without court intervention. Settlements exceeding that amount require court approval. 
118. Professor Morris suggests that it is inappropriate for the judiciary to under-
take comprehensive revision of the law regarding pain and suffering. Morris, supra 
note 1, at 47'7. He argues that legislatures have better facilities for investigation and 
formulation of law than courts, that the law should not be changed retroactively to 
reduce the claim of a victim awaiting the proper time for settlement, and that 
courts should not risk public censure by undertaking what would be recognizable as 
a lawmaking function. Id. at 482-83. However, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, see 
Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. 
L. R.Ev. 265 (1963), legislatures seldom if ever use their information-gathering powers 
for the purpose of proposing or formulating legislation; courts may, if it is deemed 
desirable, utilize the technique of prospective overruling, and the judiciary rightfully 
plays an active role in the reform of tort law. Cf. R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do 
JurnCE (1969). The judiciary should utilize a case-by-case development in order to 
produce what might be considered the experimental data from which it may more 
confidently formulate a complete statement of the rules applicable to psychogenic 
pain. Cf. Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in 
Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 271-72 
(1968). 
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not likely to have made a personality survey of his patient or to have 
investigated the interpersonal stresses to which his patient has been 
subjected at home or at work. A neurologist, psychiatrist, or psychol-
ogist hired by the defendant would be the more likely source of such 
expert testimony. However, the expert's examination of the plaintiff 
may prove procedurally complicated. 
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes express 
provision for a physical or mental examination by a physician when 
the physical or mental condition of a party is in controversy.119 Com-
parable provisions are found in the procedural rules of a number of 
states.120 Psychiatric examinations have been ordered under these 
rules, but there is very little case law to assist one in determining 
whether they provide a basis for an examination to determine 
whether a planitiff's pain is psychogenic.121 By the language of rule 
35 such an examination cannot be ordered unless the plaintiff's 
"mental or physical condition" is "in controversy" under the prevail-
ing substantive rules of tort law. The nature of the plaintiff's pain 
in this instance would relate to his physical and mental condition 
both; and, since the amount of compensation would depend on the 
examination, his condition should be considered "in controversy." 
Assuming that examinations may be ordered under rule 35, or 
119. (a) Order for examination. When the mental or physical condition (includ-
ing the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the 
legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which the action is 
pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination 
by a physician or to produce for examination the person in his custody or legal 
control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon 
notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the 
time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person 
or persons by whom it is to be made. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 35. 
120. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2231, at 665-66 
(1969). See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 2032 (West Supp. 1973); 13A DEL. CODE ANN. 
160-61 (Rule 35, Superior Court), 248-49 (Rule 35, Chancery Court); ILL. REv. STAT. 
ch. HOA, § 215 (1973). 
121. A decision of a New Jersey county court held that it was proper for a deputy 
of the Workmen's Compensation Division to order sua sponte that a claimant be 
examined by an independent neuropsychiatrist. It was also held that the neuro-
psychiatrist's testimony that the claimant suffered from a neurosis supported an 
increase in disability payments. Polulich v. J.G. Schmidt Tool Die & Stamping Co., 
46 N.J. Super. 135, 134 A-2d 29 (1957). On the other hand, a federal district court 
refused to order a mental examination of a plaintiff in an action for invasion of 
privacy in which the plaintiff alleged emotional distress, mental anguish, and injury 
to personal health, welfare, and well-being, because it was not satisfied that the 
mental condition of the plaintiff had been placed in controversy. The court stated 
that it would entertain a motion for a mental examination after hearing the opinion 
of the physician who conducted the physical examination. Stuart v. Burford, 264 F. 
Supp. 191 (N.D. Okla. 1967). In any case, precedent has limited value in this area. 
Medicine is constantly advancing, and each case is different. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
supra note 120, at 684. 
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a comparable state rule, a question may arise as to whether they may 
be made by psychologists or whether only those holding a medical 
degree will be considered "physicians" within the meaning of the 
rule. The question may be significant because an important diag-
nostic tool used in the operant treatment of pain122 is the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory, an elaborate personality test 
consisting of over 550 written, true-false questions. The answers give 
an outline of the subject's personality from which generalizations 
may be made about his attitude toward life and his susceptibility to 
operant mechanisms for production of pain.128 Although its value is 
recognized by the medical profession,124 the test is more frequently 
used by psychologists than psychiatrists. Indeed, operant treatment 
of chronic pain has its foundations in the teachings of psychologist 
B. F. Skinner, rather than in traditional medical or psychiatric 
methods. The qualification of psychologists to conduct an examina-
tion under rule 35 is therefore an important but unresolved ques-
tion. As a compromise solution, a psychiatrist might have a psychol-
ogist administer the test as part of the psychiatrist's total examina-
tion of the party. 
2. The Per Diem Argument 
New styles of advocacy have undoubtedly contributed to the 
dramatic increase in damages awarded for pain and suffering. One 
recently developed tactic to which the new medical views have ap-
plication is the per diem argument. The per diem argument, which 
stresses a unit of time system for determining the amount of damages 
that should be given for pain and suffering, is a favored-and con-
troversial-tool of claimants' attorneys. Melvin Belli first described 
the technique as follows: 
You must break up the 30-year life expectancy into finite detailed 
periods of time. You must take these small periods of time, seconds 
and minutes, and determine in dollars and cents what each period 
is worth. You must start with the seconds and minutes rather than 
at the other end of thirty years. You cannot stand in front of a jury 
and say, "Here is a man horribly injured, permanently disabled, who 
122. Operant treatment makes use of operant conditioning. See note 51 supra, 
123. See generally w. CoITLE, THE MMPI: A REvmw (1953); w. SWENSON, AN 
MMPI SOURCE BOOK (1973). 
124. See Bonica, supra note 51, at 83 (test is frequently applied at the Pain Clinic 
of the University of Washington School of Medicine). 
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will suffer excruciating pain for the rest of his life, he is entitled to 
a verdict of $225,000."125 
Using the case of a man with an irreparably injured back and a 
thirty-year life expectancy, Belli illustrated a possible closing argu-
ment to the jury: 
You are asked to evaluate in dollars and cents what pain and suffer-
ing is. This honorable court ·will instruct you that a man of this age 
has a life expectancy of thirty years. Let's put it to you bluntly, what's 
pain and suffering worth? You've got to answer this question. You've 
got to award for this as well as the special damages and loss of wages. 
Let's take Pat, my client, down to the waterfront. He sees Mike, an 
old friend. He goes up to him and says, "Mike, I've got a job for you. 
It's a perfect job. You're not going to have to work any more for the 
rest of your life .... You don't have to work even one second. All 
you have to do is to trade me your good back for my bad one and 
I'll give you five dollars a day for the rest of your life. Do you know 
what five dollars a day for the rest of your life is? Why that's $60,0001 
Of course, I realize that you are not going to be able to do any walk-
ing, or any swimming, or driving an automobile, or be able to sit in 
a moving picture show; you're going to have excruciating pain and 
suffering with this job, thirty-one million seconds a year, and once 
you take it on, you'll never be able to relieve yourself of this, but you 
get $60,0001" Do you think that Mike would take on that job for 
$60,0001126 
The obvious appeal of such an argument before a jury makes it 
understandable that defense counsel have labored hard to prevent its 
use. The major arguments against the propriety of the per diem 
tactic have been concerned ·with whether it has a foundation in 
evidence, whether counsel should be permitted to substitute their 
statements for evidence, whether counsel making such an argument 
invade the province of the jury, and whether a mathematical formula 
creates an illusion of certainty.127 By now the issue has been settled 
in most jurisdictions, with a majority allowing the use of the per 
diem argument.128 
125. M. BELLI, THE USE OF DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE IN ACHIEVING "THE MORE 
ADEQUATE AwAIID" 33-34 (1952) [hereinafter DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE]. See also 1 
M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 870-72 (1954). 
126. DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE, supra note 125, at 34. 
127. An excellent summary of the cases and law review literature dealing with the 
problem may be found in 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 81, at 141-45 (Supp. 
1968). See also Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966); 
Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 417 P.2d 673, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1966). 
128. The Supreme Court of California concluded that as of 1966 twenty-one 
jurisdictions permitted the argument and eleven did not. Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 
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The new medical evidence concerning variations in pain toler-
ances and thresholds129 suggests the impropriety of setting a price for 
pain on a per unit basis. The experience of and reaction to pain may 
vary widely from plaintiff to plaintiff and juror to juror, and an 
argument such as the per diem argument, which gives a value to 
pain that is supposedly valid for all persons, is highly questionable. 
Of even greater concern is the discovery that Mr. Belli's client 
with the irreparably injured back may well be a "low back loser" who 
has "applied for the job" of suffering because of the secondary gains 
that his painful career brings him.180 There is an obvious danger 
in asking jurors who have no desire for such a "job" to assess damages 
on the basis of the pay they personally would find appropriate. 
These new arguments are probably not sufficient to reopen debate 
over the per diem argument in jurisdictions in which the issue is 
settled, but they most certainly may be used in those jurisdictions in 
which the permissibility of the per diem argument rests in the dis-
cretion of the trial court.131 
3. Psychogenic Pain and Traditional Tort Concepts 
a. Taking a victim as the tortfeasor finds him. The new medical 
evidence may have only a limited effect on tort law if it is considered 
simply a better explanation of why an accident victim experiences 
pain. The impact of the evidence depends on how it is related to ex-
culpation of the wrongdoer under familiar tort law concepts. The 
remainder of this article suggests that such concepts provide an op-
portunity for the use of the evidence to limit compensation for pain. 
At first glance the well-established principle that the tortfeasor 
takes his victim as he finds him seems to contradict this conclusion. 
The principle requires that the wrongdoer bear the consequences of 
his tortious act regardless of any condition that made the plaintiff 
166, 173-74, 417 P.2d 673, 676-77, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 182-33 (1966). See, e.g., Baron Tube 
Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 S.2d 
82 (Fla. App. 1959); Southern Ind. Gas &: Elec. Co. v. Bone, 135 Ind. App. 531, 180 
N.E.2d 375 (1962), dissenting opinion reported separately at 244 Ind. 672, 195 N,E.2d 
488 (1964); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961} (allowing per diem 
argument); Henne v. Balick, 1 Storey 369, 146 A.2d 394 (Del. 1958); Caley v. Manicke, 
24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.W .2d 206 (1962); Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W .2d 588 (Mo. 1959) 
(rejecting per diem argument). 
129. See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra. 
130. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. See also note 64 supra. 
131. See Ratner v. Arrington, 111 S.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959); Wyant v. Dunn, 140 
Mont. 181, 360 P.2d 917 (1962); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 
23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960). 
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susceptible to greater harm than the ordinary person would have 
suffered as a result of the defendant's conduct.182 It applies not only 
to intentionally inflicted injuries, where it fits most appropriately, 
but to negligently inflicted injuries as well.133 
Although usually invoked where the plaintiff's damages were 
exacerbated by a preexisting physical weakness, courts have applied 
the principle in cases in which excess pain and suffering were due 
to the plaintiff's neurotic condition.134 In Thomas v. United States,135 
the leading decision to this effect, the plaintiff was injured when a 
government mail truck collided with the automobile in which she 
was riding. Three years before the accident the plaintiff had been 
hospitalized and treated for six months for a psychoneurotic depres-
sive reaction, and the injuries she received were a substantial factor 
in arousing this dormant condition. She suffered pain for more than 
two years, wore a neck brace for more than six months, was hospital-
ized three times, and was unable to return to work for two years. 
The court of appeals reversed for lack of supporting evidence a 
trial court finding that the plaintiff had suffered "gratification"136 
from her pain and suffering. However, the court noted evidence that 
the plaintiff was "ripe"187 for the reaction she experienced and con-
cluded that the superimposition of physical injuries on her mental 
problem increased her anxieties until she could no longer control 
them.138 As a result she underwent a more extreme reaction than 
would normally follow. Nevertheless, the court held that the sec-
ondary effect of the injuries upon the plaintiff did not lessen the 
obligation of the government to pay for her pain and suffering. In 
rejecting the government's argument that pain resulting from a 
plaintiff's psychological makeup is not compensable, the court said: 
132. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Russell v. 
City of Wildwood, 428 F.2d 1176, 1179 (3d Cir. 1970); Sweet Milk Co. v. Standfield, 
353 F.2d 811, 813 (9th Cir. 1965); Henderson v. United States, 328 F.2d 502, 504 (5th 
Cir. 1964); Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335, 347 (2d Cir. 1963); United 
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 152 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1945); Pieczonka 
v. Pullman Co., 89 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1937). See also Poplar v. Bourjois, 298 
N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948). 
133. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOR.TS § 461, comment b (1965); 2 F. HARPER & 
F. JAMES, supra note 81, § 20.3, at 1127-28. 
134. Bourne v. Washburn, 441 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Steinhauser v. Hertz 
Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970); Parrish v. United States, 357 F.2d 828 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966); Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1964). 
135. 327 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1964). 
136. 327 F.2d at 380. 
137. 327 F.2d at 381. 
138. 327 F.2d at 381. 
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"Until the sciences of law, psychiatry and psychology co-develop to a 
stage at which there is a fuller understanding of human pain and 
suffering, we think it unwise to formulate a rule of damages which 
reduces the compensation for an injured plaintiff to a 'net,' after 
crediting the tortfeasor with a secondary effect of the in jury due 
plaintiff's psychic weakness, aroused by the injury."130 The Courts of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia140 and the Second Circuit141 
have similarly held that damages may be recovered for pain suffered 
because injuries received in an accident cause a recurrence or ag-
gravation of a preexisting psychic weakness. 
It is not surprising that courts have so held. It has become con-
ventional to discuss mental disorders in terms of mental "illness," 
a construct that carries with it a strong suggestion of a physiological 
base.142 Uncritical acceptance of such a view, or unwillingness to be 
persuaded by a psychiatric analysis disclosing a nonorganic base, leads 
to treatment of preexisting psychic weakness as though it were a thin 
skull, a weak back, or hemophilia-the classic hornbook illustrations 
of the principle requiring a tortfeasor to take his victim as he finds 
him.143 However, as noted above,144 not all persons suffering from 
psychogenic pain have personality disorders, and it is quite unneces-
sary to postulate some form of emotional disturbance for the exis-
tence of operant pain. It is therefore inaccurate to characterize such 
pain as a product of a preexisting physical or mental condition of the 
person injured. The pain is experienced because family, work, or 
other social factors lead the victim subsequently to adopt a life of 
chronic pain. While the tortfeasor may have to take his victim as he 
finds him, it is a different matter to require the tortfeasor to take 
his victim as the victim's family, friends, or co-workers relate to him 
and as he subsequently responds to those relationships. 
Moreover, the rationale for the principle that the tortfeasor must 
take his victim as he finds him is by no means clear. The doctrine 
originated when the principal mode of tort recovery was an action 
for trespass, in which no distinction was drawn benveen foreseen and 
139. 327 F.2d at 381 (footnote omitted). 
140. Bourne v. Washburn, 441 F.2d 1022 (1971). 
141. Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (1970). 
142. For a vigorous criticism of this view, see T. SZASZ, THE MITH OF MENTAL 
!Lr.NESS (1961). 
143. See, e.g., w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 261·62 (4th 
ed. 1971). 
144. See text following note 32 supra. 
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unforeseen consequences.145 Once established, the principle may have 
been carried to negligence actions for reasons other than those that 
led to its adoption. Certainly it has served the judiciary well by 
sparing it the difficult tasks of deciding how severe an injury "should" 
have become, how much pain "should" have been suffered, or how 
much income "should" have been lost. 
The new medical understanding, however, makes it administra-
tively feasible to distinguish between psychogenic pain and pain that 
has a physiological base, particularly if the burden of proof is on the 
defendant. Indeed, defense counsel might even be able to establish 
what pain is suffered because of a preexisting psychic disorder. Thus, 
that portion of the plaintiff's pain properly allocable to the defen-
dant's actions may be isolated, and recovery limited accordingly. 
Viewed in terms of how well compensation for psychogenic pain 
serves the interests of society, the principle requiring the tortfeasor 
to take his victim as he finds him should not inexorably require 
compensation for psychogenic pain. 
b. Avoidable consequences. Another familiar principle of tort 
law is that a victim is not entitled to recover for harm he could have 
avoided by making reasonable efforts or expenditures after the tor-
tious injury.146 The principle bears a close relationship to the con-
tributory negligence doctrine; factors considered in determining 
whether a person made reasonable efforts to avoid harmful conse-
quences are generally the same as those considered in determining 
whether conduct is negligent.147 However, contributory negligence 
must be a cause in fact of the accident or injury to bar recovery. By 
contrast, conduct to which the avoidable consequences principle is 
applicable simply affects the amount of resultant harm. A typical 
case is that of an injured person's failure to obtain medical treatment 
that would have reduced the seriousness of his injuries.148 The roots 
of the principle include a policy of discouraging waste and com-
munity notions that fair compensation need not extend to injuries 
that are in a practical sense self-inflicted.149 
While the principle usually applies when the plaintiff fails to 
mitigate his harm after the tort, related cases include those in which 
145. W. PROSSER, supra note 143, § 7, at 29. 
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). 
147. Id., comment c. 
148. See, e.g., Updegraff v. City of Ottumwa, 210 Iowa 382, 226 N.W. 928 (1929). 
149. Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. The President Harding, 288 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 
1961); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 918, comment a (1939). 
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the plaintiffs negligent conduct prior to the accident contributes to 
the seriousness of his injuries, although not a legal cause of the 
accident. In Mahoney v. Beatman,150 a classic case of this sort, the 
defendant's automobile crossed the center line and grazed the left 
front wheel of the plaintiff's automobile. Because of its speed, the 
plaintiffs automobile went out of control and was demolished; only 
slight damage had been done by the contact with the defendant's 
automobile. A majority of the Connecticut supreme court concluded 
that the plaintiff was entitled to full recovery, but its opinion has 
never received the approval that the commentators have bestowed 
upon Justice Maltbie's dissent.151 Justice Maltbie would have limited 
the plaintiffs recovery to the damage done by the initial impact and 
denied recovery for that part of the damages attributable to the 
excessive speed of plaintiff's automobile.152 
A comparable problem recently came before the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit,153 and Judge Friendly gave his approval to 
Justice Maltbie's view. The mvner of a building sought to recover 
for losses suffered when employees of a tenant negligently failed to 
call the fire department after the outbreak of a fire. Because of build-
ing code violations of the mvner, however, the building was particu-
larly susceptible to fire. Judge Friendly concluded that a jury could 
consider the faulty construction of the building in awarding damages 
to the owner, and he gave his approval to a jury verdict of 120,000 
dollars, in lieu of the 820,000 dollars actually lost by the plaintiff, as 
a just, although unscientific, apportionment. 
What might be called the "seat belt" cases have recently presented 
additional occasions for considering the principle of avoidable con-
sequences and the related treatment of ,contributory negligence that 
does not cause an accident but does aggravate the injuries suffered. A 
number of courts have allowed juries to consider whether damages 
should be reduced because the plaintiff's injuries in an automobile 
accident would have been less if he had been wearing a seat belt;lll4 
150. 110 Conn. 184, 147 A. 762 (1929). 
151. See 2 F. HARPER &: F. JAMES, supra note 81, § 22.10, at 122; w. PROSSER, sttpra 
note 128, § 65, at 423-24; Gregory, Justice Maltbie's Dissent in Mahoney v. Beatman, 
24 CoNN. B.J. 78 (1950). 
152. HO Conn. at 206-07, 147 A. at 770-71. 
153. East Hampton Dewitt Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 490 F.2d 1234 
(1973). 
154. See North v. Scheurer, 285 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Uresky v. Fedora, 27 
Conn. Supp. 498, 245 A.2d 393 (1968); Mount v. McClellan, 91 Ill. App. 2d 1, 234 
N.E.2d 329 (1968). 
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other courts have indicated that the failure to wear an available seat 
belt may go to the jury on the question of contributory negligence.155 
The applicability of the avoidable consequences doctrine to psy-
chogenic pain turns in large part upon whether the adoption of a 
career of pain after in jury is something that reasonable efforts or 
expenditures could have avoided. Since victims of psychogenic pain 
are generally unconscious of the mechanisms that produce their pain, 
it is difficult to charge them on a subjective standard with failure 
to behave reasonably. Perhaps also their reactions following injury 
should not be characterized as conduct because the reactions are 
unconscious rather than understood and voluntary acts. However, 
the law ordinarily determines reasonable conduct on the basis of an 
object~ve standard.1156 Unless the actor is a child or a mental incom-
petent deficiencies and variations of temperament and emotional 
balance are not taken into account.157 If an objective standard is used 
to judge the response to accidental injury the conclusion might well 
be reached that psychogenic pain is an "avoidable consequence." The 
reactions that produce it certainly are not socially desirable, nor are 
they reactions that all persons similarly situated would have had. 
And, to the extent that the plaintiff contributed to his damages be-
fore the accident by surrounding himself with a social environment 
that is conducive to pain, his pain was "avoidable." Community no-
tions of fairness might well lead to a conclusion that compensation is 
not required for such conduct.158 
c. Inevitable consequences. If a defendant cannot invoke the 
avoidable consequences principle, he may perhaps avoid liability by 
155. See Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971); Turner v. 
Pfluger, 407 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1969); Tiemeyer v. Mdntosh, 176 N.W.2d 819 (Iowa 
1970); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 
362, 149 N.W .2d 626 (1967). However, a majority of courts still refuse to allow the 
failure to wear a seatbelt to be considered contributory negligence. See Woods v. 
Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Fla. 1969); Moore v. F~cher, 505 P .2d 383 (Colo. App. 
1972); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967); Brown v. Kendrick, 
192 S.2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1966); Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 213 S.2d 784 
(La. App. 1968); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); 
Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W .2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970); Dillon v. Humphreys, 56 Misc. 2d 
211, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1968); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 
160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Ore. 52, 457 P.2d 483 (1969); Derheim 
v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972). See also Kavanagh v. 
Butorac, 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. App. Ct. 1966). 
156. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283, comment c (1964); REsrATEMENT OF 
ToRTS § 918, comment c (1939). 
157. Id. § 283(b), comment b. 
158. Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. The President Harding, 288 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 
1961). 
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arguing the relevance of the rule of causation and damages applica-
ble to inevitable consequences. According to this rule an actor is not 
responsible for harm that another would have suffered even if the 
actor had not injured him.159 In the leading case of Dillon v. Twin 
State Gas & Electric Co.,160 a fourteen-year-old boy playing on a 
girder of a bridge lost his balance and fell. He attempted to save 
himself from the fall by grabbing an electrical wire that the defen-
dant had negligently failed to insulate. The boy was electrocuted and 
suit was brought by his estate. The New Hampshire court held that 
if it could be shown that the boy would have fallen with serious 
injury regardless of the defendant's negligence-that is, that some 
injury was an inevitable consequence of the boy's situation without 
regard to the defendant's acts-his loss of life or earning capacity 
should be measured by its value in light of his inevitable injury.161 
The inevitable consequences doctrine follows from the tradi-
tional view that conduct is not a cause in fact of harm that would 
have occurred irrespective of the conduct. That view has been ac-
cepted in the Restatement of Torts,162 subject to an exception that 
permits, but does not require, a finding that the actor's negligent 
conduct was a substantial cause of harm even though there was 
another force equally capable of producing the harm.163 It is con-
sistent with the requirement that events occurring after tortious 
injury but prior to trial be taken into consideration if they indicate 
that the damages suffered were either greater or less than would have 
been expected at the time of the accident.164 The principle has found 
recognition in recent years in cases involving a preexisting physical 
condition of a plaintiff that might have worsened even without the 
tortious injury.165 More to the point, it has also been recognized in a 
159. See W. PROSSER, supra note 143, § 65, at 423-24. 
160. 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. lll (1932). 
161. 85 N.H. at 457, 163 A. at 115. 
162. REsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 432(1) (1934). See also w. PROSSER, supra note 143, 
§ 52, at 321-22. This principle is consistent with the principle that events occurring 
after tortious injury, but prior to trial, should be considered as relating to the 
foreseeability of the amount of damages. See REsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 910, com-
ment b (1939); Seavey, The Effect on Tort Damages of Events Occurring Before Trial, 
66 HARV. L. REv. 1237 (1953). ' 
163. R.EsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 432(2) (1934). 
164. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 910, comment b (1939); Seavey, supra note 162. 
165. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 328 F.2d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 1964); 
Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335, 347 (2d Cir. 1963); Kegel v. United 
States, 289 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mont. 1968). Cf. Sweet Mille Co. v. Stanfield, 353 F.2d 
811 (9th Cir. 1965). On the other hand, in workmen's compensation cases the effect 
of the accident and a prior disease are not weighed in determining the loss of 
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decision dealing with a tortfeasor's liability for psychic harm suffered 
because the plaintiff's mental condition made her more susceptible 
than the average person to such injury.166 Judge Friendly remarked: 
Although the fact that [the plaintiff] has latent psychotic tendencies 
would not defeat recovery if the accident was a precipitating cause of 
schizophrenia, this may have a significant bearing on the amount of 
damages. The defendants are entitled to explore the probability that 
the child might have developed schizophrenia in any event. While 
the evidence does not demonstrate that [the plaintiff] already had the 
disease, it does suggest that she was a good prospect .... [l]f a defen-
dant "succeeds in establishing that the plaintiff's pre-existing condi-
tion was bound to worsen * * an appropriate discount should be 
made for the damages that would have been suffered even in the 
absence of the defendant's negligence.167 
The problem for the defendant in psychogenic pain cases, then, is 
not so much law as it is proof. It must be shown that the plaintiff, 
because of his psychic or social condition, was primed for pain: At 
some time after the accident he would have utilized some other in-
jury to produce the pain of which he complains. Such proof is ob-
viously difficult, and the plaintiff is further protected by the rule 
placing the burden of proof on the defendant.168 Again to quote 
Judge Friendly, however: "It is no answer that exact prediction of 
[the plaintiff's] future apart from the accident is difficult or even 
impossible. However taxing such a problem may be for men who 
devoted their lives to psychiatry, it is one for which a jury is ideally 
suited."169 
d. Proximate cause. Many of the important policy decisions in 
the law of torts are made under the heading of proximate cause. The 
term itself, for which it would be better to substitute the phrase 
"legal cause,"170 offers nothing to assist analysis of whether the rela-
tionship between the conduct of the defendant and the resultant 
harm is such that the defendant should be held responsible. However 
confused and obfuscating proximate cause language may be, the 
earning capacity, nor is shortened life expectancy due to an existing disease con-
sidered. 1 LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 12.20, at 3-263-65 (1972). 
166, Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970). 
167. 421 F.2d at 1173-74, quoting Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335, 
347-48 (2d Cir. 1963). 
168. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 81, at § 20.3. 
169. 421 F.2d at 1174. 
170. See REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 (1934). 
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principal function of the concept is to limit the scope of liability to 
less than it would be if causation in fact were the only test. 
Confidence in psychiatry and medicine has in recent years in-
creased the scope of liability for tortious conduct.171 Perhaps it may 
also lead to some limitations on liability. The strongest case for such 
a limitation is one in which the plaintiff's preexisting idiosyncrasy is 
so rare that he suffers injury as a result of psychic stimuli that are not 
likely to injure an average person. Conduct that is a cause in fact of 
the injury does not give rise to liability where there is neither 
negligence nor legal cause.172 In most cases involving psychogenic 
pain, however, there has been some physical injury and negligence 
has been established. The question is whether liability should be cut 
short of responsibility for all consequences, although recognized for 
some of the consequences. 
In his famous Palsgraf opinion,173 Justice-then Chief Judge-
Cardozo suggested the possibility that liability be limited to the 
interests invaded by a negligent act: "There is room for argument 
that a distinction is to be drawn according to the diversity of interests 
invaded by the act, as where conduct negligent in that it threatens an 
insignificant invasion of an interest in property results in an unfore-
seeable invasion of another order, as, e.g., one of bodily security."174 
The suggestion found approval in the Restatement of Torts, but 
approval was later withdrawn for lack of case support.17° None-
theless, the basic Palsgraf formula is an appealing resolution for dis-
putes about the ambit of liability for harm-producing conduct: "The 
171. From a rule requiring that there be at least some tortious impact upon 
the person of the plaintiff, the law has moved to allow recovery where the bodily 
harm results from shock or fright at harm or peril to an immediate family member 
occurring in the plaintiff's presence. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (Tent. 
Draft No. 19, 1973). See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 81, § 18.4, at 1031-34; W. 
PROSSER, supra note 143, § 54, at 330-34. Earlier cases viewed suicide as an interven-
ing cause and refused to impose liability when a seriously injured person, depressed 
by his condition and future prospects, chose to end his life. E.g., Scheffer v. Railroad 
Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1881). See W. PROSSER, supra, § 44, at 280-81. More recently liability 
has been imposed where expert testimony establishes that the suicide is the result 
of an uncontrollable impulse that was in tum the result of the tortious injuries 
suffered. Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wash. 2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961); W. 
PROSSER, supra, § 44, at 280-81. 
172. Smith, supra note 62. 
173. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
174. 248 N.Y. at 346-47, 162 N.E. at 101. 
175. REsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 281, comment j (1934). See id., app. § 281, at 307-
08. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 143, at _259-60. 
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risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."176 The 
formula suggests that an actor has a duty to refrain from conduct 
that unreasonably threatens the physical safety of another, but does 
not have a duty to protect the other from pain that is experienced 
as a reaction to interpersonal relationships with family, fellow work-
ers, or others.177 
An analogous formulation has recently been offered by Professor 
George Fletcher. He suggests that rights to recover for losses should 
depend in part on an analysis of the reciprocity of risks imposed by 
parties upon one another.178 Thus, "we all have the right to the 
maximum amount of security compatible with a like security for 
everyone else. This means that we are subject to harmJ without com-
pensation) from background risks, but that no one may suffer harm 
from additional risks without recourse for damages against the risk-
creator."170 Psychogenic pain, or pain maintained by operant mechan-
isms, may be considered a "background" risk. In any case, it is so 
individualized that surely it is nonreciprocal within Fletcher's 
formulation. Thus, it does not deserve compensation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
These observations haye explored the possibility that new medi-
cal evidence will result in a limitation on damages awarded for pain. 
However, so well entrenched is the right to recover for pain suffered 
after physical injury that the new understanding of pain is unlikely 
to produce significant change. Still, sooner or later we must acknowl-
edge the questions the data raise about what the law of compensation 
176. 248 N.Y. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100. 
177. An analogy may be found in the principle that imposes strict liability upon 
one engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity. The absolute liability is restricted 
to the types of risks that make the conduct abnormally dangerous. R.EsrATEMENT OF 
ToRTs § 519, comment b (1938). Thus, persons engaging in blasting operations, who 
would be liable for damages done by flying debris or concussion, have been held not 
liable for the destruction of mink kittens by their frightened and agitated mothers. 
Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 552, 125 P .2d 794 (1942); Foster v. 
Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954). Of course, there is a wide 
range for social decision-making in defining the risks that lead to characterization 
of conduct as abnormally dangerous. Definition of the risks of blasting as not includ-
ing the risk that mother minks will kill their young is a way of saying that it is 
better that mink ranchers bear the risks of the excitable nature of minks than that 
blasters compensate them for harm for which blasting operations were a cause in 
fact. The decision will determine how much mink coats will cost as well as how 
much it will cost to build on land that must be cleared by blasting. 
178. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. R.Ev. 537 (1972). 
179. Id. at 550 (emphasis added). 
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is doing and what it should be doing to serve better the interests of 
society. Tort law will be improved if lawyers and judges attack the 
problem of compensating victims of pain with a better understanding 
of the new medical evidence. Permitting recovery only for pain that 
has a physiological basis would be a major step toward ensuring that 
compensation furthers useful social values. 
